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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ANGELO RAV ARINO, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
HARRY PRICE, JR., and MRS. Case No. 7882 
HARRY PRICE, JR., his wife, and 
MRS. MARCUS PARR, also known 
as ARLINDA PRICE PARR, 
Defendants arnd Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
INTRODUCTION 
A brief general statement of issues will aid in under-
standing the full statement of facts, to follow. 
In this case, respondent obtained a decree of specific 
performance against appellant Harry Price, a half-owner, 
who did not sign the written agreement specifically en-
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forced; and he obtained the same decree, also, against 
appellant Mrs. Parr, the other half-owner, who did con-
sider and signed up on a different agreement than the one 
enforced. 
She investigated and signed up two documents in-
tended to trade one of the lots involved to a third person 
in an exchange for his property. That this trade was the 
only transaction considered by any of the appellants in 
connection with conveying any real estate is established 
by the testimony on both sides, as well as by a number of 
written documents drawn up, and some of them executed, 
to complete this exchange transaction. 
One of the documents so signed by Mrs. Parr and 
now enforced below, was however, filled out later by 
respondent's real estate agent so that it could be sepa-
rated from the other documents, as it was, and was then 
signed by respondent and asserted as a cash offer by 
respondent to purchase the "one lot" described therein 
from appellants for $19,000.00 cash. The trial court has 
now construed this contract as covering two lots, which 
two were priced by appellants at $35,000.00, instead of the 
one lot intended to be traded, and the decree compels 
appellants to convey both lots to respondent for $19,-
000.00. 
Respondent never claimed the right to possession, 
and never had possession of either parcel; he never paid 
anything to appellants and never performed, or, prior to 
suit, tendered performance of the contract now asserted, 
in whole or in any part. And, the Statute of Frauds is 
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attempted to be avoided only beeause of the allegation 
that respondent bought a strip of ground 19 ft. x 4 rods 
which could be used to extend a rail right-of-way to the 
rear of one of these lots of appellants. This was claimed 
to be a '"change of position" by respondent, in expectation 
· of getting appellants' land. So that we have now been 
ordered to selllOO sq. rod~ of our land so that respondent 
can so use his slightly over -1 sq. rods. 
After this clain1 of change of position was asserted 
m Court, '\Ve filed answers denying that we had ever 
agreed or intended to sell, as claimed, or at all, but in 
order to save respondent harmless on account of his 
purchase of this little strip appelllants tendered an agree-
ment and offer (R. 9, 12) to take this from him at what 
he paid for it. We continue to so tender. 
So, when this decree was entered, as we believe, there 
was lacking any of the basic legal grounds or reasons for 
specific performance, particularly of an oral contract. 
No loss would result to respondent if specific per-
formance is denied. On the other hand, the decree im-
poses upon appellants a transaction never intended at all 
and one involving burdensome income tax consequences, 
and the actual loss of one parcel of their ground entirely, 
and other inequitable results. 
The effect of documentary and undisputed evidence 
and also the lack of evidence, resulting in failure of sup-
port for the material findings; and also the failure of 
these findings to support the conclusions and decree, are 
presented ·under the four basic legal propositions recited 
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in the four points which follow the statement of facts. 
This case must be determined here upon the record 
and the law (Const. 4-rt. VIII, Sec. 9) and as to it the 
Trial Court had no advantage, because: 
First, the determination rests upon the application 
of these four principles of law. There is no necessity to 
resolve conflicts of oral testimony. Hargreaves v. Burton, 
206 P. 262, (Utah 1944); Tripp v. Bagley, 276 P. 912, 917 
(Utah 1929). 
Secondly, the documentary evidence tells the whole 
story and on these documents rests also any question of 
credibility here, so that this Court is in as good a position 
on such matters as was the Trial Court. Roane v. Roane, 
67 S.E. (2) 906, 910 (Va. 1951); Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F. 
(2) 537 (C.A. 2nd 1950). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
We are compelled to set forth the facts in the instant 
case without direct reference to the findings approved by 
the Court below. Those findings do not reflect accurately, 
or at all, the testimony and the exhibits in this case. 
Moreover, since the purpose of this appeal is to review 
the granting of a decree of specific performance, this 
Court will consider de novo issues of fact as well as issues 
of law. 
Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 9; Har-
greaves v. Burton, 206 P. 262, 264 (Utah 1922); Tripp v. 
Bagley, 276 P. 912, 917 (Utah 1929). 
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The appellanb, Harry Price and .Mrs. Marcus Parr, 
are brother and sister, and together own, as tenants in 
conunon, the property which is the subject matter of this 
law suit. ~lrs. Price has no interest in that property ex-
cept a wife's inchoate statutory interest to which she may 
succeed in the eYent that she survives her husband. 
The property involved in this controversy is located 
in Salt Lake City. It consists of two lots of real estate. 
One lot is located at :2:25 \Yest 5th South Street, and the 
other at 235 \Vest 5th South Street. The lot located at 225 
West 5th "South Street, 6 x 10 rods, has a warehouse lo-
cated upon it. The other lot at 235 West 5th South Street, 
4 x 10 rods, has a small residence on it (R. 187, 233). The 
lots are covered by separate abstracts, Exhibits A and 
B, and they are physically separated by a fence and were 
acquired by appellants' father from different sources 
(R. 234, Ex. A, Entry 34; Ex. B, Entry 67) and at dif-
ferent times. 
The undisputed testimony establishes that the two 
women defendants considered that only the lot with the 
warehouse upon it, i.e., the lot located at 225 West 5th 
South Street, was to be conveyed in any transaction here-
in involved (R. 173, 174, 180, 191). This was the only lot 
that was appraised by the appraiser employed in con-
nection with any proposed contract with the appellants 
(R. 222). Admittedly Harry Price, to the extent that he 
knew anything at all about a proposed contract, was 
under the impression that both lots were intended to be 
involved (R. 177, 178, 234). 
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The first thing that occurred with regard to any pro-
posed disposition of the Price property took place in 
May, 1950 (R. 76). At this time Harry Price, Jr. was con-
tacted by a real estate agent and broker named Lewis 
Hansen (R. 59, 76). As a result of this contact, initiated 
by Hansen, a price of $35,000 for both of the lots owned 
by the Prices and Mrs. Parr was discussed (R. 103, 104). 
This $35,000 figure was entered on a listing card which 
had stricken from it all multiple and other contract list-
ing authority (Ex. D). 
Subsequent to this and in August, 1950, Lewis Han-
sen, acting on behalf of Ravarino, the respondent, pre-
sented orally to Harry Price a cash offer of $18,000. An 
offer in writing was signed by respondent for the sum of 
$18,000 in cash (R. 76). This written offer is Exhibit 2 
and consists of an earnest money receipt and agreement 
describing the property, as follows: 
"1-Lot 165 x 165 at 235 West 5th So." 
Hansen was promptly informed that the Prices and 
Mrs. Parr did not wish to sell any of the property for 
cash (R. 232, 24, 77, 164). The two reasons for this, as 
related by Mrs. Parr (R. 187, 196), were that the dollar 
had depreciated in value so that the money would not do 
them much good, and that the money received would, of 
necessity, be subject to the high income tax rates then 
prevailing. It was also considered and mentioned that 
cash received from a sale of the property might soon be 
dissipated (R. 77). 
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Thus, a~ early as the sunnner of 1950, it was evident 
to all concerned that a cash transaction could not be con-
summated; the defendants would only consider a trade 
(R. 104, 105, 16-!). In other words, the defendants would 
consider only trading their property for other "income-
producing'' property, free of income tax, and they would 
not sell their property for cash. 
Hansen then set about to find property for which the 
Prices might be willing to trade (R. 62, 77, 164, 194). 
Hansen suggested several properties to Mrs. Price. None 
of these properties were, upon inspection, satisfactory 
(R. 164). Finally property owned by one A. C. Mollerup 
located at 243-249 West 4th South Street, hereafter desig-
nated as the ~lollerup property, was suggested for a 
trade (R. 78, 165). This nlollerup property was shown by 
appoinhnent to :Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr by Ben Rich, 
another real estate agent who had a listing on it (R. 188, 
139). This was in the early part of September, 1950 (R. 
139, 167). According to Hansen, the women did not know 
much about real estate and therefore wanted the Mollerup 
property examined by a friend of theirs who was familiar 
with real estate values (R. 80). That friend was a Mr. 
Schluter, a banker from Woods Cross (R. 38, 207). 
Mr. Schluter did examine the Mollerup property 
and also appraised the lot owned by Harry Price and 
Mrs. Parr which had a warehouse erected upon it, i.e., 
the lot located at 225 vVest 5th South Street (R. 221). 
l\Ir. Schluter was never asked to examine or appraise the 
other lot located at 235 West 5th South Street with the 
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residence upon it (R. 222), because the women did not 
consider that it was involved in any proposed contract. 
Mr. Schluter testified: 
"I only appraised the property where the 
Moab Transportation Company was. I did look at 
the house next door and understood that was their 
property, I wasn't asked to appraise that." (R. 
222). 
This appraisal took place on September 18, 1950 (R. 223). 
Adjacent to the lots owned by the Prices and adjoin-
ing them on the south was property, hereafter referred to 
as the Terry property, some of which Mr. Schluter under-
stood at the time of his appraisal to have already been 
purchased by Mr. Ravarino for use as a spur track (R. 
166, 221, 222). Mr. Schluter got his information concern-
ing this Terry property from Mrs. Price, who had been 
told by Hansen prior to Schluter's appraisal, that the 
Terry property had been purchased by Ravarino, and 
that by reason of that purchase the value of the Price 
properties would be greatly depreciated (R. 166). This 
is not denied by Hansen (126, 136). 
The Terry strip is 19ft. x 4 rods (Ex. M). It was in 
connection with this only that the name of Ravarino was 
mentioned at all to Mr. Schluter (R. 224). This Terry 
property is the property which the complaint alleges was 
purchased in reliance upon the alleged promise of defend-
ants to sell. Quite some time prior to this (Ex. 3), on 
August 8, 1950, Mr. Ravarino had signed an earnest 
money receipt for Hansen containing an offer for the 
purchase of this Terry strip. 
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The appraisal by ~lr. SchlutPr of the Price lot with 
the warehouse upon it, i.e., the lot located at 225 West 
5th South Street, and his further appraisal of the Moller-
up property, fonued the basis upon which a trade of those 
properties was being considered (R. 80, 178, 195). He 
gave .Jlrs. Price a valuation figure on the one warehouse 
lot alone of $20,000.00 ( R. 178). 
The total figure arrived at, according to Hansen's 
own testinwny, as the price for the niollerup property, 
was $35,000.00 ( R. 80). This purchase price was to be 
paid in the following Inanner ( 35, 54, 64, 134, 156, 17 4, 
179, 19:2, 194, 196, 215, 224, and Exs. J and F). The Prices 
and ~Irs. Parr were to convey the warehouse lot to Mol-
lerups and receive an $18,000.00 credit for it. They were, 
in addition, to pay the difference between this and the 
$35,000.00, a balance of $17,000.00, in monthly cash pay-
ments of $175.00 (Exs. J-1, J and F). 
The interest figure on the balance of $17,000.00 was 
omitted from Ex. J -1, and a difference on the interest 
arose with the illollerups (Ex. I, 119, 120, 140, 151, 217). 
The agents, Hansen and Rich, were working out also a 
deal whereby A. C . .Jlollerup would sell and convey the 
warehouse property that he received from the Prices to 
Ravarino in return for $18,000.00 in cash which Mollerup 
was to receive (R. 109, 140). This transaction is clearly 
illustrated by Exs. F and J drawn up by Hansen and 
Rich, and the latter signed by the defendant women and 
the Mollerups. This is the only transaction, as this record 
clearly and indisputably shows, which was discussed by 
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the parties following the rejection of respondent's $18,-
000.00 cash offer in July or August, 1950. 
In regard to the next important step that occurred 
in the negotiations, there is a c9nflict of testimony. Ac-
cording to Hansen, he presented two documents (Exs. 
E and J) to Mrs. Price. Both documents, Hansen testi-
fied, were signed by her at that time. Hansen also testi-
fied that at this time he received from her a check for 
$500.00 to be applied upon the Mollerup property (R. 80), 
as recited in Ex. J. Both Exs. E and J are dated Septem-
ber 21, 1950, and they are both forms entitled "Earnest 
Money Receipt and Agreement." 
Mrs. Price testified that Ex. J was signed by her at 
her home on September 23, 1950. She fixed the time ac-
cording to the rental date of guests she was then enter-
taining (R. 167, 168, 182). According to Mrs. Price, Ex. 
E was signed on September 25, 1950, at Hansen's office 
(R. 171). Mrs. Price testified that she was told by Lewis 
Hansen that Harry Price would have to sign the docu-
ments before they would be legally binding (R. 169, 176). 
She also testified that Exhibit E was just a blank form 
at the time she signed it (R. 172, 179, 180). It is without 
dispute that Mr. Ravarino's signature or name was not 
in or on Exhibit E at the time it was so signed (R. 180, 
237, 244). Ravarino signed Exhibit Eon October 5, 1950 
(R. 244). Mrs. Price and the other defendants never re-
ceived a copy of Exhibit E at any time, according to 
Hansen and all the testimony (R. 114, 115, 237). 
10 
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~Irs. Parr testified that an appoinhnent was 1nade 
for her to sign son1e doctm1ents at Hansen's office on 
Septen1ber ~6, 1950 (R. 189). This was in connection with 
the .Jlollerup properties she had been shown (R. 188). 
At this tiine she testified that Hansen told her that her 
signature was only necessary to carry on the negotiations 
in good faith, and that the documents were not binding 
tmtil Harry Price should sign them (R. 189, 190-191, 192, 
193, 19-1:). This is not denied by Hansen (R. 84, 122, 123) 
and is fully substantiated by Attorney Ed Jensen, who 
testified that both the wmnen as well as Hansen told him 
that Hansen had represented to the women that neither 
of the docun1ents signed were to be binding until Harry 
Price had signed them ( R. 210). This fact must, there-
fore, be taken as having been conclusively established. 
Mrs. Parr also testified that Exhibit E was in blank 
when she signed it, and that it was pointed out to her that 
her money, the $500.00 (Ex. J), would be returned and the 
arrangement be of no force and effect if not approved 
within three days (R. 190, 192). Mrs. Parr testified that 
Hansen read this to her from Ex. J ( R. 190). She never 
knew of Ex. E, in its present form, until this suit was filed 
(R. 190, 192). 
It is undisputed here, because there is not a line of 
testimony in this record to contradict Mr. and Mrs. 
Prices' testimony, that it was after this time that Harry 
Price first learned that the women had signed any docu-
ment (R. 186, 42). The only document that Harry Price 
was then told about as having been signed by the women 
was Ex. J ( R. 186, 65, 66 33). Although Hansen seems 
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to suggest that he called Harry Price on the telephone 
between the time that Mrs. Price signed and the time that 
Mrs. Parr signed, it is apparent that he is referring to a 
conversation which took place way back in August, 1950 
( R. 83). The women and also Harry Price testified that 
they knew nothing of the contents of Ex. E as presently 
filled out until after this law suit was commenced, at 
which time they first received a copy of it (33, 57, 65, 66, 
173, 174, 179). Moreover, it is clear that the only contract 
ever submitted to Harry Price for his approval was Ex. 
F, which is a real estate contract with a deed attached 
that embodies the terms of Ex. J ( R. 219), and this was 
the only contract submitted to Ed Jensen, Harry Price's 
attorney (R. 146). It is agreed that Harry Price never 
saw and was never asked to sign Ex. E (R. 57, 62, 219). 
It will clarify the discussion of the events which fol-
low if the Court has a clear picture of the nature of the 
documents represented in this litigation as Exs. E and 
J. Before presenting that picture, however, it should be 
mentioned that Harry Price never signed either document 
nor was Lewis Hansen or respondent ever told that Harry 
Price would sign or accept their terms ( R. 127). 
Exhibit J is an Earnest Money Receipt and Agree-
ment which provides for the purchase for $35,000.00 of 
the property described in it and the payment of $17,000.-
00, balance therefor, to Mr. and Mrs. A. C. Mollerup. 
Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr are designated in Ex. J as 
buyers and A. C. Mollerup is designated as seller. It re-
cites that $500.00 has been received to apply on the pur-
chase price. Exhibit J-1 is the copy of Ex. J given to 
12 
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.. 
--
:Jlrs. Price. Exhibits J and J -1 contain the following 
language: 
'"Contract of sales * * * to be made on the ap-
proved fonn of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board." 
The terms of this Earnest ~loney Receipt are later in-
corporated into Ex. F, which is a Unifor1n Real Estate 
Contract. From the facts which we have set forth above, 
it is very evident that this Earnest Money Receipt and 
this Agremnent are consistent with the prior investiga-
tions, discussions, and negotiations, including the ap-
praisal of the :Jlolle~·up and Price properties by Mr. 
Schluter. 
Exhibit E IS also an Earnest Money Receipt and 
Agreement. It now sets forth as a consideration for the 
conveyance of certain property designated therein as a 
single lot the sum of $19,000.00 in cash. The lot mentioned 
in Ex. E is the lot located at 235 West 5th South Street. 
This is the lot with the little house upon it. In it Mrs. 
Price and Mrs. Parr are designated as sellers, while 
Angelo Ravarino is indicated as buyer. From the facts 
that we have recited which occurred prior to its alleged 
execution, it can be seen that there was never any discus-
sion with reference to a $19,000.00 figure at all (R. 191). 
Nor was there any reference at all or any discussion at 
the time it was executed, that in any way indicated that 
J; the defendants were willing to sell or convey for $19,-
fl· 000.00 in cash (R. 80). 
Sometin1e after these two documents were signed 
by the women, Lewis Hansen picked up the abstract on 
13 
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the Mollerup property (R. 84, 118). This abstract was 
sent down by· Ben Rich to Mr. Jensen's office for pur-
poses of examination (R. 142). Also prepared by Hansen, 
and submitted to Mr. Jensen, who was Harry Price's at-
torney, in addition to Ex. F, were Exs. G and H (R. 146). 
Ex. G is a Warranty Deed (a copy of which is attached 
to Ex. F) providing for a conveyance of the Price proper-
ties to A. C. Mollerup, as grantee. The Prices and Mrs. 
Parr are designated therein as grantors. These deeds are 
obviously the outgrowth of Ex. F. The other document 
prepared with these, and which was necessary (R. 146) to 
"close the deal," was Ex. 0 which was not, however, sub-
mitted to. Mr. Jensen (R. 146). Exhibit 0 is a deed which 
calls for a conveyance of property from A. C. Mollerup 
as grantor, to respondent, Ravarino, as grantee. Pre-
sumably Ex. 0 was not submitted to Mr. Jensen because 
it did not concern the Prices or Mrs. Parr. Exhibit E, it 
should be pointed out, was not at this time, or ever, sub-
mitted to Mr. Jensen. 
Mr. Jensen never looked at any of the documents 
except the abstract of title on the Mollerup property (R. 
207, 208). All the documents, except the abstract, upon 
Mr. Jensen's receiving them, were placed in a drawer 
in Mr. Jensen's office (R. 207). The name of Ravarino, 
or any deal with him, was never mentioned to Mr. Jensen 
(R. 208, 213). 
Mr. Jensen had the abstract on the Mollerup prop-
erty examined by another attorney, a Mr. Livingston (R. 
204), and Mr. Hansen was then informed of the opinion 
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concerning the title to that property. The title opinion 
raised son1e objections to the title to the Mollerup prop-
erty. 
The docu1nents relating to the trade, Exs. F, G, and 
H, ,were retrieved fr01n nlr. Jensen's office by Mr. Rich 
prior to a meeting in October between l\Ir. Rich, Mr. Han-
sen and l\lr. and l\1r~. Price, which will be dealt with here-
after (R. 1-16). A8 indicated above, Mr. Jensen had 
neither looked at, nor approved, the documents (R. 208). 
In the latter part of September, Hansen tried to get 
Harry Price to sign up for the utilities on the Mollerup 
property as of the beginning of October (R. 95, 96, 145). 
It was at this time also that Ex. F, the real estate con-
tract, was prepared. 
About this san1e time, and about two weeks after Exs. 
E and J had been signed by the women, Harry Price was 
contacted over the telephone by Hansen with regard to 
the Terry property which, as has been previously pointed 
out, was a strip of land located south of one lot owned by 
the Prices ( R. 87). According to Hansen, Hansen asked 
Harry Price if it would be all right if Ravarino purchased 
the Terry strip, and Harry replied in the affirmative. 
At that time, and long thereafter, Harry was still investi-
gating the Mollerup property (R. 125, 230, 231). Also 
mentioned was something about the Price property being 
a "goat farm" unless they had a right-of-way to it (R. 
88). As nlr. Hansen testified: (R. 130) 
"I wanted then1 to have that property (i.e., the 
Terry property) to go with their property, because 
it is a key to the situation and no good to anybody 
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else without it. Well I emphasized that a lot of 
times because it was important to both parties to 
not let that Terry property go to any other prop-
erty because it was the right-of-way and the only 
right-of-way and it was important to have it with 
that property." 
Following the signing of Exs. E and J, Mrs. Price 
left for Denver, Colorado. The date of her departure was 
September 27th. She returned to Salt Lake City on 
October 13th (R. 173). In the interim Mr. Rich had one 
or two conversations with Harry Price with reference 
to clearing up the title on the Mollerup property (R. 146, 
147). In the interim, also, Hansen was told by Ed Jensen 
that Harry Price hadn't made up his mind as to whether 
or not he would go through with the trade arrangement 
(R. 206). 
The next important and significant event was a meet-
ing which took place in October to which we have referred 
above, and which took place in Mr. Hansen's office. This 
is the only occasion when the defendants, Mr. and Mrs. 
Price, got together at one time with either of the real 
estate agents, Rich or Hansen (R. 91, 149, 175). Neither 
of the defendants ever saw Ravarino until later. This 
meeting took place about the 19th or 20th of October (R. 
176). The purpose of it was to attempt to close the trans-
action whereby the Prices and Mrs. Parr would trade to 
Mollerup their warehouse property located at 225 West 
5th South Street as a down payment on the Mollerup 
property. The documents necessary to carry out this 
arrangement between the Prices and Mrs. Parr and Mol-
lerup were presented to the Prices at this time (R. 91). 
16 
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These doctuuents were Exhibit F (the uniform real estate 
contract which incorporates the terms of the earnest 
money receipt and agreeiuent, Exhibit J), Exhibit G (a 
deed of the Price property running from the Prices and 
~Irs. Parr as grantors to A. C. _Mollerup as grantee), and 
Exhibit H (identical to Exhibit G). Exhibit 0 (a deed 
running frmn ~-\.. C. ~Iollerup to Ravarino and covering 
the Price property) was also "present" presumably be-
cause it was to be delivered to respondent upon Ex. H 
being executed by the Prices and _Mrs. Parr. The convey-
ance fron1 ~Iollerup to Ravarino was necessarily depend-
ent upon 1\follerup receiving the Price property pursuant 
to the execution of Exhibits F, G, and H. As we pointed 
out above, Exhibit 0 had not previously been submitted 
to Ed Jensen, or presented to appellants. Exhibit E, 
or any deed or contract embodying the terms of Exhibit 
E, was not discussed or mentioned at all in this important 
meeting (R. 92). 
There are two important events that took place just 
prior to this October meeting which should be mentioned 
before discussing the events that occurred in that meet-
ing. 
Jus.t prior to this October meeting, and in anticipa-
tion of it, Mr. Rich had consulted with the Bureau of In-
ternal Revenue in order to ascertain the tax consequences 
of the proposed trade transaction insofar as the Prices 
and Mrs. Parr were concerned (R. 144). This consulta-
tion with the Bureau was occasioned by a communica-
tion frmn l\1r. Hansen to Mr. Rich to the effect that Harry 
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Price was "worried" about the "income tax feature of the 
property." (R. 144). The hypothetical case put to the 
Bureau was whether a tax would be incurred if the Price 
property was exchanged in a trade for the Mollerup prop-
erty (R. 155). The Bureau informed Mr. Rich, so he said, 
that no income tax would be due upon such a transaction. 
Also, sometime prior to this meeting, and on October 
5th, the deal for the purchase of the strip of the Terry 
property had been consummated. The date of the deed 
from the Terrys to Ravarino is October 5, 1950 (Ex. M). 
This is also the date established by the testimony of Mrs. 
Terry, who sold the property to Ravarino (R. 159). It 
is very important to point out that this transfer took 
place just one day after the deed from Mr. and Mrs. A. 
C. Mollerup to Ravarino was dated and executed by the 
Mollerups (Ex. 0). At the same time to the day that 
the Terry deal was completed, according to the testimony 
of plaintiff and Hansen, Hansen was given a check for 
$19,000 (Ex. N, 88, 89, 93, 244). At this time, October 
5th, Ravarino told Hansen that he, Ravarino, would give 
Hansen just one week to complete a deal for the $19,000 
figure. Some of the testimony on this is as follows: 
"I signed that (Exhibit E) at the same time 
we buy the Terry property, see." (R. 244); 
"I gave Mr. Hansen one week. You know he 
come so many times in my place, so I gave Mr. 
Hansen one week, 'If you fix it up, fix it up for 
$19,000 okeh, I give you one week.'" (R. 242, 244). 
And so, at the same time, also, that the Terry prop-
erty was purchased, Exhibit E was signed by Ravarino 
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(R. 244). Prior to this date of October 5th, and this is 
very ilnportant, Ravarino and Hansen had discussed 
only the sun1 of $18,000 ( R. :245). Thus October 5th was 
the very first date upon which Hansen was authorized by 
Ravarino to present a $19,000 figure to appellants. And 
thus, also, October 5th was the first date at which negotia~ 
tion~ were about to connnence on the $19,000 figure. 
The purchase of the Terry strip is, therefore, con-
clusively not referable to Ex. E at all. 
Returning again to the October meeting, Hansen 
testified as follows with regard to the events that took 
place (R. 91): 
"Q. Was Exhibit G present in those discussions f 
A. Yes. 
Q. I will show you Exhibit H, was Exhibit H 
present in those discussions~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right, tell us now what was said and what 
took place in that meeting in your office. 
A. They were looking over them for some time 
and some discussions and information that 
various ones wanted and that finally l-one 
of us said-'Well, if it is okeh let's sign it.' 
Harry said everything looks okeh and Ben 
Rich said: 'We have been over to the income 
revenue with Rollie Wise and it is made so 
you are saving income tax on it.' He said: 
'It is okeh, but I want to check them a day.' I 
think he took these with him, most of these 
exhibits, and left, and that is all that hap-
pened that day as far as I remember." 
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All the exhibits just referred to, i.e., Exs. G, H and 
0, were, according to the testimony of Rich, drawn "ac-
cording to the way the deal developed and on instructions 
of Mr. Hansen, see." (R. 155). The version of Mr. Rich 
is substantially the same as Hansen's regarding the 
events that occurred in this October meeting in Hansen's 
office (R. 149). 
After this October Ineeting, the first conversation be-
tween Harry Price and the Ravarinos occurred. Accord-
ing to the testimony of the younger Ravarino, plaintiff's 
son, this conversation took place at the end of October (R. 
161). Harry Price, according to the younger Ravarino, 
said: (R. 161) 
"He didn't say he was going ahead with it, 
he wanted to get a tax angle straightened out, as 
soon as he got the tax angle straightened out he 
would give us an answer, but he was going to 
Boise, Idaho, then or the next day, and when he 
returned he would give us the answer." 
According to the elder Ravarino: 
"Q. And he (Hansen) told you these people had 
said they would accept that figure, $19,-
000.00~ 
A. The lady that was accept it, and after Mr. 
Price come there, he said, 'I am going on the 
road five or six days, when I come back I 
will let you know, yes or no.'" (R. 245). 
Hansen called Harry Price "dozens" of times (R. 
94) and Ben Rich testified that following the meeting in 
October, "nothing particularly" happened (R. 152). There 
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were a lot of telephone conversations in which Rich got 
after Han~en for not closing the deal (H. 152). 
Finally, on X ovember 1-!, 1950, A. C. Mollerup ad-
dressed a letter of •· :N otiee and De1nand" upon Mrs. Price 
and ~Ir~. Parr (Ex. 1). It de1nands cmnpliance with the 
contract (Ex. J) and asks the1n to con1ply before Novem-
ber 20, 1950. It also states that in the event of their fail-
ure to so comply within that ti1ne, A. C. ~iollerup will con-
sider himself released frmn any obligation to perform. 
There followed a reply to this letter sent by Mr. Ed 
Jensen, Attorney, at the solicitation of Mrs. Price and 
:Mrs. Parr (R. :217). That letter is dated November 18, 
1950 (Ex. I). It states that ~Irs. Price and Mrs. Parr 
understood that there was to be no interest on the $17,-
000.00 balance upon the Mollerup contract, after the $18,-
000.00 credit, and that the deal could not be completed if 
this interest was added. Interest at 5% was inserted in 
the copy signed by Mollerups (Ex. J). No interest was 
inserted in the copy signed by the defendant women and 
delivered by Hansen to them (J-1). 
As late as December 11, 1950, Hansen was trying to 
get Harry Price to sign up and to accept the Mollerup 
property ( R. 125). Harry Price was still investigating 
the ~iollerup property after this suit was started on Ex. 
E (R. 125, 230, 231). 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
THE COURT BELOW IMPROPERLY GRANTED SPECI-
FIC PERFORMANCE BECAUSE THERE IS NO ORAL OR 
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WRITTEN CONTRACT OBLIGATING THE DEFENDANT, 
HARRY PRICE, TO CONVEY ANY PROPERTY OWNED BY 
HIM TO PLAINTIFF, AND HENCE, SAID DECREE WAS 
RENDERED CONTRARY TO LAW AND IN VIOLATION OF 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT BELOW IMPROPERLY GRANTED SPECI-
FIC PERFORMANCE BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN NO 
PART PERFORMANCE WHATSOEVER OF ANY CONTRACT 
WITH DEFENDANT HARRY PRICE, AND THE PLAINTIFF 
HAS NOT OTHERWISE BEEN FRAUDULENTLY IMPOSED 
UPON AND SO HE IS NOT ENTITLED, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, TO RELIEF IN EQUITY AS AGAINST SAID DEFEND-
ANT. 
POINT III. 
THE AGREEMENT ENFORCED BY THE COURT BE-
LOW IS CONTRARY TO THE UNDERSTANDING AND IN-
TENTION OF PLAINTIFF AND ALL DEFENDANTS AND 
IS, THEREFORE, UNENFORCEABLE IN EQUITY, AND THE 
F AlLURE OF THE COURT BELOW TO MAKE A FINDING 
UPON THIS ISSUE CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT BELOW IMPROPERLY GRANTED SPECI-
FIC PERFORMANCE BECAUSE THE CONTRACT EN-
FORCED BY THE COURT BELOW WAS SIGNED BY DE-
FENDANTS, MRS. HARRY PRICE AND MRS. MARCUS 
PARR, UNDER MISAPPREHENSION, MISREPRESENTA-
TION, AND MISTAKE, AND HENCE, SAID CONTRACT IS 
UNENFORCEABLE IN EQUITY. 
ARGUMENT 
We will sustain these four Points in the order stated. 
POINT I. 
THE COURT BELOW IMPROPERLY GRANTED SPECI-
FIC PERFORMANCE BECAUSE THERE IS NO ORAL OR 
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WRITTEN CONTRACT OBLIGATING THE DEFENDANT, 
HARRY PRICE, TO CONVEY ANY PROPERTY OWNED BY 
Hil\I TO PLAINTIFF, AND HENCE, SAID DECREE WAS 
RENDERED CONTRARY TO LAW AND IN VIOLATION OF 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
There is no dispute at all in this case regarding the 
fact that defendant, Harry Price, at no time signed any 
written contract involved in this case. Hence, there is no 
written promise on his part that is enforceable in this ac-
tion. 
In view of this admitted fact, the plaintiff must rely 
on an oral contract between plaintiff and defendant Price 
that is consistent with the agreen1ent enforced by the 
Court below (Ex. E) against all of the defendants. 
It is only after a definite contract is established by 
plaintiff that consideration need be given to the issue of 
"part performance" of that contract sufficient to remove 
the bar of the Statute of Frauds. For, as this Court has 
stated, '"until the parties have agreed as to the terms 
there is not an enforceable contract in fact, and partial 
performance cannot make up for the deficiency in the 
understanding between the parties." Campbell v. Nelson, 
125 P. (2) 413, 415 (Utah 1942). 
See, also, Adams v. Manning, 148 P. 465, 466 (Utah 
1915); Mestas v. Martini, 155 P. (2) 161 (Colo. 1944). 
Given then the necessity here that an oral contract 
between plaintiff and defendant Price be established by 
plaintiff, the next issue is the standard of proof essential 
to establish that contract. 
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With regard to oral contracts for the sale of land, 
a higher standard of proof is required than the pre-
ponderance of the evidence sufficient in most civil cases. 
The .oral promise requisite to secure enforcement of a 
contract for the sale of land must be proved by "clear 
and convincing" evidence. Or, in other words, the oral 
contract must be established by evidence which meets the 
standard of proof necessary to reform a contract, estab-
lish the perpetration of fraud and the like. 
"The first requirement of the doctrine that 
part performance of an oral contract exempts it 
from the provisions of the statute of frauds is that 
the contract be proven by evidence that is clear 
and unequivocal and which leaves no doubt as to 
the terms, character, and existence of the con-
tract." Granquist v. McKean, 187 P. 2d 623, 626 
(Wash. 1947). 
"A mere preponderance of the evidence is not 
sufficient. If the evidence leaves it at all doubtful 
as to whether or not a contract was entered into, 
the Court will not decree specific performance." 
Id. at 626. 
With this authority, this Court is in accord. 
Clark v. George, 234 P. 2d 844, 848 (Utah 1951); 
Clark v. Clark, 279 P. 502, 504 (Utah 1929) : 
"The plaintiff, in declaring specific perform-
ance of an oral contract must establish the terms 
thereof with a greater degree of certainty than is 
required in an action at law, and he must show a 
clear mutual understanding and a positive agree-
ment of both parties to the terms of the contract." 
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1.1! ontgomery r. Ben·ett, 121 P. 569, 570 (Utah 1912) ; 
Moffat v. Hoffulan, 214 P. 308 (Utah 1923) at 310: 
'"It is also essential that the parol agreement 
or gift should be established by clear, unequivocal 
and definite testinwny." 
That this is the law generally, c·annot be doubted. See, 
Annota.tion, 101 A.L.R. 923 (1936) at 998: 
"Before a Court of equity will specifically 
enforce a parol contract on the ground of part per-
fornlance, the contract must be established to the 
satisfaction of the Court by clear and unequivocal 
proof." See, also, Bock v. Schott, 217 P. 2d 768 
(Ore. 1950); Anderson v. Whipple, 227 P. 2d 351 
(Ida. 1951); Baker v. Heavrin, 29 N.W. (2) 375 
(Neb. 1947). 
Given these well established rules, on the standard 
of proof applicable in this class of cases, the next issue 
is whether the proof in the instant case meets this stand-
ard. 
More precisely, the present issue is whether there is 
"clear and convincing" evidence in this Record which 
leaves no doubt that Harry Price spoke an oral promise 
consistent with the terms of the earnest money agreement, 
Exhibit E, sued upon; that such promise was communi-
cated to plaintiff; and that plaintiff accepted that promise 
or offer. 
It is our contention, which we believe is conclusively 
borne out by this record, that there is a complete failure· 
of proof on this fundamental issue. We do not and cannot 
find here any oral offer or promise in accordance with 
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Exhibit E, the contract sued upon, on Price's part. We 
find no evidence whatsoever that any offer or promise 
on Price's part was ever at any time communicated to 
plaintiff. And we find no acceptance here of any such 
offer or promise. In short, there is con1pletely lacking 
here the three elements which make up a contract, the 
offer, the communication of that offer, and its acceptance 
by the offeree. And there being no contract here at all 
between plaintiff Ravarino, and defendant Price, no relief 
can be granted plaintiff against said Harry Price, Jr. 
In applying the facts of this case to the law above 
cited, including the law establishing the high standard 
of proof applicable here, we shall deal separately with our 
three contentions above set forth. First we shall point out 
that there is no offer on Price's part. S.econd, we shall 
point out that there is no evidence here of the communica-
tion of any offer of Price's to plaintiff. And, third, we 
shall show that there is no acceptance by plaintiff. 
1. In considering whether there is any offer or 
promise on the part of defendant Harry Price one para-
mount consideration must be kept in mind. It is not 
enough for plaintiff to establish an oral offer on Price's 
part to do something. Plaintiff must go much farther 
and show by "clear and convincing" evidence that defend-
ant Price agreed to the exact terms of the contract en-
forced by the Court below. It is our position that Harry 
Price never agr~ed to do anything. But even if plaintiff 
endeavors to controvert this, that is not enough. Plaintiff 
must establish much more. Plaintiff must show that 
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Harry Price clearly and unequivocally said that he would 
convey to Angelo Rc'l.varino his interest in both lots of real 
estate for the 8Uin of $19,000 in cash. 
'Ve draw the Court's attention to this point particu-
larly, because plaintiff in the Court below referred that 
Court to testi1nony which was only pertinent to a pro-
posed exchange agree1nent which was entirely different 
fron1 the contract h~re sued upon (R. 87, 88). As we shall 
hereafter point out, that testimony is completely irrele-
vant in so far as it is attempted to relate it to Exhibit E, 
the contract sued upon, and it does not establish any oral 
promise on Price's part in any event. 
With this consideration in n1ind, we proceed to a dis-
cussion of the facts as they relate to this issue. 
It is our belief that certain factors considered in the 
aggregate denwnstrate that respondent and his real es-
tate agents could never reasonably expect or anticipate 
that Harry Price would orally agree to the terms of Ex. 
E. It is important to point these factors out because the 
words or conduct of Harry Price are important only with 
reference to the meaning that reasonably can be placed 
upon them. 
As early as August, 1950, when the offer of respond-
ent to purchase the Price property for $18,000.00 was re-
jected (Ex. 2), it was quite evident to Lewis Hansen and 
respondent that a conveyance of the Price property in re-
turn for cash simply could not be arranged (R. 77, 164, 
232). Subsequent negotiations and documents were fully 
premised upon this understanding by all the parties con-
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cerned. It was after this $18,000.00 cash offer (Ex. 2) 
was rejected that Hansen, himself, set out to find prop-
erties that were suitable and available for a trade. It was 
after this same offer was rejected that A. C. Mollerup 
was reported as having property which might be traded 
for the Price property, and it was this trade arrangement 
that was thereafter constantly before all the parties for 
their consideration. It was only much later, as of October 
5, 1950, that a belated attempt was made by respondent 
to try to revive a cash deal for $19,000.00. 
In this connection it is significant that Harry Price, 
as well as his wife and sister, never received a copy of 
Ex. E, and he never saw it prior to this law suit (R. 114, 
115, 237, 33, 179, 181). He was never asked to sign it (R. 
219). It was not received in evidence against him (R. 
28). It was never submitted to his attorney, Mr. Ed 
Jensen, for his approval (R. 146). None of these facts 
are in controversy. In short, Harry Price never had a 
chance to consider Ex. E., let alone assent to its terms. 
If there was the slightest expectation that Harry Price 
would sign Ex. E, no doubt he would have been asked to 
sign it. 
We do not have to rely, however, solely on this back-
ground which indicates that the words and conduct of 
Harry Price could never be construed as an agreement 
on his part to the terms of Ex. E. In response to a direct 
question propounded to him as to whether or not he had 
been told that Harry Price would go through with any 
deal, the respondent replied in the negative (R. 245): 
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"Q. 'Vhen l\lr. Hansen presented you with Exhibit 
"'E' for' your signature, those two signatures 
were on it on the left-hand corner~ 
.. A.. They were on it. 
Q. Did he haYe $19,000.00 in there at that time~ 
A. lie have the nwney at that tiine. 
Q. Did he have $19,000.00 in there at that time~ 
A. I have the figure, yes. 
Q. And he told you these people had said they 
would accept the figure $19,000.00~ 
A. The lady that was accept it, and after l\1r. 
Price come there, he said, 'I am going on the 
road five or six days, when I c01ne back, I will 
let you know, yes or no.' 
Q. Let me ask you this, Mr. Hansen and you dis-
cussed $18,000.00 before that~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. When he came back to you for your signature, 
he had $19,000.00 ~ 
A. That is when I told him I will give you $19,-
000.00 if you settle in one week's time." 
No Court ever has, and we trust that no Court ever 
will, try to spell out a promise from "I will let you know, 
yes or no." 
And, it is apparent beyond question that a man who 
gives his broker $19,000.00 and says that he will give him 
one week to close a deal, does not then think that he has a 
completed deal. Thus, on October 5th, when the $19,-
000.00 figure was first proposed by Ravarino, he did not 
think or understand that he then had a contract, and, 
thereafter, when Ravarino and his son talked to Harry 
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Price in person, Ravarino was told that Harry Price 
would let him know later, "yes or no." 
It is this incident alone which pertains to the $19,-
000.00 cash figure which, on October 5th, Ravarino first 
authorized Hansen to present to Harry Price and with 
reference to which Hansen had a week to seek Harry 
Price's assent. 
All other incidents and events prior to this conversa-
tion between Ravarino and Hansen clearly pertained to 
an entirely different contract and arrangement. This 
arrangement was the trade arrangement between the 
Prices and Mollerups, and the trade arrangement and 
documents had nothing to do whatsoever with any figure 
of $19,000 or to a cash sale of any kind. It was only the 
trade arrangement about which Harry Price was deliber-
ating. Even in connection with this trade arrangement, 
represented by Exs. J, J -1, F, G and H, Harry Price was 
always doubtful. He was, as Hansen told Rich, "worried" 
(R. 144). 
Plaintiff endeavored to present to the Court below 
some evidence of an oral promise uttered by Harry Price. 
One portion only of the transcript was referred to. The 
portion of the transcript referred to (R. 87, 88) was cited 
in support of Paragraph 10 of the findings approved by 
the Court below. This part of the transcript concerns a 
contemplated purchase by Ravarino of the Terry prop-
erty, not the Price-Parr property. The testimony, related 
by Hansen (R. 87, 88), is that "after the first part of Sep-
tember, or the last part of September, I told him (i.e. 
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Price) we were ready to elose that now and I wanted to 
be sure there wouldn't be any trouble. . . . " 
"Q. Can you confine yourself to the conversation, 
~lr. Hansen 1 
..:\. 1 said: ·If there is no objections, I will go 
ahead and close it.' He said: 'That is fine, go 
ahead.'" 
Reliance cannot be placed upon this conversation be-
cause these brief rernarks of Harry Price do not consti-
tute any kind of a promise or offer at all. Harry Price is 
not manifesting his assent to any contract with him. He 
is only indicating his consent that Mr. Ravarino purchase 
property adjacent to his. Harry Price was merely asked 
if he objected if Ravarino purchased a right-of-way ad-
jacent to his property, and he replied in -the negative. 
This is perfectly consistent with Harry Price's testimony 
elsewhere (R. 35, 36, 37). Prior to this conversation, Han-
sen had also discussed with Mrs. Harry Price the pur-
chase of the Terry property (R. 166). The tenor of Han-
sen's remarks to Mrs. Price was that he was trying to use 
the Terry purchase to coerce the defendants into the ex-
change contract. 
In short, this conversation in the latter part of Sep-
tember only indicates that Harry Price had no objection 
to Ravarino's engaging in contractual relations with a 
third person. That conversation is, of course, irrelevant 
insofar as it is attempted to show an oral promise or 
offer by Harry Price consistent with Exhibit E. 
Hansen says that this conversation (R. 87, 88) took 
place after the last part of September. If this is so, it 
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is then very evident that any words of Harry Price at 
that time were referable only to the proposed trade ar-
rangement represented by Exhibits J, J-1, F, G, H, and 
0. There are several items of testimony which indicate 
conclusively that any remarks or conduct of Harry Price 
after the last part of September could only be referable 
to the trade arrangement. 
First of all, Hansen testified that just prior to this 
conversation concerning the Terry property Hansen had 
urged Harry Price to sign up for the utilities on the 
Mollerup property as of the first of October (R. 95, 96, 
145). Price's signing up for the utilities on the Mollerup 
property could, of course, only be relevant insofar as 
carrying out the proposed trade arrangement was con-
cerned. And by urging Price to sign up for the utilities 
on the Mollerup property Hansen was necessarily urg-
ing Harry Price to go ahead on the trade arrangement 
with Mollerup. Hansen could not therefore understand 
that any remarks of Harry Price spoken at the very time 
the Mollerup contract was being urged upon him could 
refer to anything except the Mollerup contract (Ex. F). 
Moreover, the Mollerup contract, Exhibit F, was 
drawn up on Hansen's instructions at the very time this 
conversation between Hansen and Price took place! Ex-
hibit F is dated 'September 30th. And as to the drawing 
up of Exhibit F, Rich testified as follows: (R. 155) 
"Q. This deal that you drew up, which involved, 
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Q. It was drawn according to your understand-
ing of what the deal was 1 
A. It was drawn according to the way the deal 
developed and on instruction of Mr. Hansen, 
see. 
Q. And these docmnents, they are the deeds and 
various things you testified you had drawn 
that affected the proposition in accordance 
with your instructions 1" 
A. Fr01n ~Ir. Hansen, yes sir." 
Thus it can be clearly seen that Hansen instructed 
Rich to dra-w up Exhibit F, the contract solely between 
the Prices, ~Irs. Parr, and :M:ollerup that provided for 
the trade, at the very same time that the conversation 
(R. 87, 88) between Hansen and Harry Price took place. 
Hence that conversation can be referable only to this Ex-
hibit F and the contract and trade arrangement between 
the Prices, Mrs. Parr, and Mollerup. 
Moreover, at the time of this conversation between 
Hansen and Price, the title to the Mollerup property was 
being discussed, and defects in that title were being clear-
ed up. (R. 85, 86, 142). This also amply illustrates that 
Harry Price was considering only that trade arrangement 
through which he would receive title to the Mollerup prop-
erty. 
Furthermore, it was subsequent to this conversation 
between Hansen and Price after the last part of Septem-
ber (R. 87, 88), according to respondent himself, that 
Hansen was first authorized by' respondent to seek Harry 
Price's assent to the cash transaction for the sum of $19,-
000. Hansen was so authorized only as of October 5, 1950, 
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(R. 245, 244). It is clear, then, that H.arry Price could not 
be assenting to a contract or figure which respondent 
had not yet authorized Hansen to present to him for his 
acceptance. Any words or conduct which respondent re-
lies on as indicating Harry Price's assent to the $19,-
000 cash sale must, of necessity, have occurred subse-
quent to October 5th. Prior to that date Hansen and 
Ravarino had discussed only a figure of $18,000 (R. 245). 
Much more could be cited to the effect that Harry 
Price only considered the trade arrangement at any time, 
and that his words and conduct are only referable to that 
trade arrangement. Indeed Hansen says nothing at any 
time that would even suggest that Harry Price would 
ever assent to the terms of Exhibit E. As to Harry 
Price's general state of mind, with regard to any pro-
posed contract with him, Hansen says that Harry Price 
never did make up his mind, and that he was dragging his 
feet (R. 126, 127). 
2. As we have indicated above, there is clearly no 
offer on Price's part, nor any offer referable to the con-
tract (Ex. E) here sued upon. Even if the contrary were 
true, however, and even if there was such. an oral offer, 
there is not any evidence in this record to show that such 
an offer was ever communicated to respondent. 
In order to point out the importance of this lack of 
communication of any offer from Price to Ravarino, we 
must first consider the relation of the real estate broker, 
Hansen, to both parties. 
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Hansen was a real estate broker acting as an inter-
mediary between the parties. Regardless of whom he 
represented his only function and authority as a real 
estate broker was to carry offers back and forth between 
the parties involved. Brokers are only authorized to act 
by cmnmunicating offers back and forth "as negotiators 
in bringing other persons together to bargain." 8 Am. 
Jur., BROKERS, Section 2. 
A real estate broker has no authority whatsoever 
to execute a contract of sale in behalf of his principal. 
See the n1any cases cited to this effect in an annotation 
at 48 A.L.R. 634 ( 1927) at 635. In other words a real 
estate broker cannot consummate a contract by accept-
ing an offer on behalf of his principal. The broker merely 
acts as a conduit in reporting that offer to his principal 
for the purpose of having the principal accept it. 
A showing to the effect that an offer was made to 
Hansen by Price here is wholly lacking. But even if it 
were shown that such an offer was made, it still must be 
shown that such an offer was communicated to the offeree. 
Any evidence to that effect in this record is totally 
absent. There is not the slightest evidence to show that 
the remarks of Harry Price relied on by respondent in 
the Court below (R. 87, 88) which we have previously 
referred to were at any time reported to Ravarino. A 
fortiori, those remarks were never reported to Ravarino 
as having any contractual significance. Thus, regardless 
of what construction is put upon these remarks relied 
upon by respondent (R. 87, 88), until it is established 
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that these remarks were communicated to respondent, 
there can be no contract. 
We have previously abstracted testimony of re-
spondent from the record (R. 245) which conclusively 
shows that respondent had never been told by anyone 
that Harry Price had agreed to the figure of $19,000 
for a cash sale of his property. We quote again the 
pertinent testimony on this point: (R. 245) 
"Q. And he (Hansen) told you these people had 
said they would accept the figure $19,000 ~" 
"A. The lady that was accept it, and after Mr. 
Price come there, he said, 'I am going on the 
road five or six days, when I come back, I will 
let you know, yes or no.'" 
The substance of this and other testimony is that 
Ravarino had never been told by Hansen or anyone else 
that Harry Price would accept a cash figure of $19,000 
as provided in Exhibit E, the contract sued upon. Rav-
arino himself, the one to whom the offer must, of neces-
sity, have be.en communicated, says that when he talked 
to Harry Price personally there was no promise made 
to him. Hence it is as clear as it possibly could be that 
no offer was communicated to Ravarino directly or in-
directly at any time. 
3. We have shown that there was no offer made 
by Price. We have shown further that there was never 
any communication of any offer on Price's part to re-
spondent. There was, of necessity then, no acceptance 
by respondent of any offer made to him by Harry Price. 
At no point in his testimony does Ravarino state at any 
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time that he accepted an offer from Harry Price by the 
tenus of which Harry Price would convey property to 
him for the sun1 of $19,000 in cash. 
The only testinwny is to the effect that, on October 
5, 1950, Ravarino told Hansen that he would give Hansen 
$19,000 if Hansen could settle a transaction for that 
figure in one week's time ( R. 2-15). There is no evidence, 
following this offer of October 5th, that such an offer 
was ever communicated to Harry Price. On the contrary, 
later in October, Harry Price was urged to sign up on 
the contract solely between himself, his wife, his sister, 
and A. C. l\follerup (R. 91). And Hansen himself testi-
fied that he urged Harry Price to sign up on that Mol-
lerup contract (R. 91, 92). Hansen testified that there 
was no discussion at this time of any earnest money 
receipt (R. 92). It was, then, solely the contract between 
th Prices, 1\frs. Parr and Mollerup that was urged upon 
Price as the deal to be signed up in the latter part of 
October. And Hansen therefore did not, in his role as 
an intermediary between the parties, even communicate 
to Harry Price that $19,000 offer made by Ravarino on 
October 5th. 
From a consideration of all three of these conten-
tions it can, therefore, be seen that there is no oral 
contract here whatsoever. There are not any words or 
conduct of Harry Price that can be construed in any 
sense as an assent to the terms of Ex. E. There is no 
communication of any offer from Harry Price to Rav-
arino or from Ravarino to Harry Price. There is no 
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acceptance by Ravarino of any offer made by Harry 
Price. 
There is, on the other hand, ample and abundant 
documentary evidence in this record which clearly shows 
what the contract was that the defendant Price and the 
other appellants were considering. This documentary 
evidence consists of the following exhibits prepared by 
Hansen and Rich for the purpose of carrying out a 
proposed trade: Exhibits J, J-1, F, G, H, and 0. 
With this documentary evidence in this record, some 
remarks recently made by the Virginia Supreme Court 
are highly pertinent here: 
"A litigant should not prevail when he offers 
documentary evidence and testimony of disinter-
ested witnesses to prove the terms and conditions 
of one verbal contract and then offers his own 
testimony in support of another containing terms 
and conditions wholly inconsistent with the first. 
Such inconsistent evidence falls far short of prov-
ing parol contracts for the sale of land with that 
degree of certainty and definiteness which is 
required to sustain a decree of specific perform-
ance." Roane v. Roane, 67 S..E. (2) 906, 910 (Va. 
1951). 
POINT II. 
THE COURT BELOW IMPROPERLY GRANTED SPECI-
FIC PERFORMANCE BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN NO 
PART PERFORMANCE WHATSOEVER OF ANY CONTRACT 
WITH DEFENDANT HARRY PRICE, AND THE PLAINTIFF 
HAS NOT OTHERWISE BEEN FRAUDULENTLY IMPOSED 
UPON AND SO HE IS NOT ENTITLED, AS A MATTER OF 
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The plaintiff eannot surmount the obstacle posed 
by Point I, just considered. There is still another ob-
stacle, Inoreover, that necessarily and as a matter of 
law precludes the granting of specific performance 
against appellant Harry Price, Jr. 
Even if a definite oral contract were established by 
"clear and convincing" evidence, that alone is clearly 
not enough. Papanikolas vs. Sampson, 274 P. 856 (Utah 
1929). See, Annotation, 58 A.L.R. 1015 (1929): 
"The simple failure or refusal to reduce a 
verbal contract to writing, or to sign such an 
agreement, unaccompanied by elements of estop-
pel, or other circumstances invoking the equitable 
powers of the Court, is not such a fraud as will 
authorize and justify excepting the contract from 
the operation of the 'Statute of Frauds." 
Before discussing what is essential, in addition to 
the definite oral contract, to entitle the plaintiff to relief, 
we will proceed to state what we believe are the precise 
issues on his Point II. In order to point out these issues, 
it is necessary to review a little history regarding the 
origin of the doctrine of specific performance of oral 
contracts for the sale of land. 
This doctrine "may be traced to a rule of equity 
which, antedating the English Statute of Frauds required 
as a prerequisite of the enforcement of parol contracts 
concerning land that the plaintiff show that the contract 
had been partly performed, or that he had so altered his 
position in reliance on the agreement that a refusal to 
enforce it would amount to a fraud upon him." 49 Am. 
Jur., STATUTE OF FRAUDS, Sec. 420. 
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See, also, Annotation, 101 A.L.R. 926 (1936) at 932: 
"It seems that even before the enactment of the English 
Statute of Frauds courts of equity had adopted the rule 
of requiring, as a prerequisite of the enforcement of 
parol con tracts concerning land, that the plain tiff show 
that the contract had been partly performed, or that 
he had so altered his position in reliance on the agree-
ment that a refusal to enforce it would amount to a 
fraud upon him." 
In other words, historically equity intervened in this 
class of cases if there was either part performance or if 
the plaintiff would be defrauded unless relief was grant-
ed in his favor. It was subsequent to this development 
by the equity courts that the English and American 
Statutes of F'rauds were enacted. With the enactment 
of these statutes, it could be held that the former equity 
practice was superseded; or, that the Statute of F·rauds 
enacted the two pre-existing rules formulated by equity 
courts; or, finally, that the Statute of Frauds re-enacted 
one or the other of the pre-existing rules, but not both 
of them. 
With the enactment of the various Statutes of 
Frauds in the United States, however, little attention 
was paid to the independent development of the two 
equity doctrines mentioned above. Instead of adopting 
any of the alternatives above mentioned, the American 
Courts, following Pomeroy and Story, combined the two 
equitable principles and treated them as one principle, 
namely, that to remove an oral contract from the Statute 
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of Frauds there must be arts done in part performance 
which place the party performing in a situation so that 
the failure to decree specific performance would result in 
a fraud upon hin1. 
See .Annotation, 75 A.L.R. 650 (1931); Shaughnessy 
v. Eidsmo, 23 N.\Y. (2) 362 (iliinn. 1946); Pound, The 
Progress of the Laze, 33 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 
929 (1920) at 937 et seq.; Costigan, The Date and Author-
ship of the Statute of Frauds, 26 HARVARD LAW 
REVIE\V 329 (1913) at 343 et seq. 
The decisions of this Court follow Pomeroy and 
formulate the rule that the acts relied upon must be in 
part performance of the contract and, in addition, must 
be such that to allow the defense of the Statute of Frauds 
would be to perpetrate a fraud on the other party. In 
short, part performance and fraud must be shown. Price 
v. Lloyd, 86 P. 767, 770 (Utah 1906) ; Hargre:aves v. 
Burton, 206 P. 262, 266 (Utah 1922) ; Utah M ercur 
Gold Mining Co. vs. Herschel Gold Mining Co., 134 P. 
'2) 1094, 1096 (Utah 1943). 
This so-called "equitable fraud" theory is the law 
1n the great majority of states. 'See, Annotation, 166 
A.L.R. 443 ( 194 7). 
The decisions of this Court are also consistent with 
U.C.A. 33-5-8 (1943), which authorizes, but does not 
require, enforcement of an oral contract for the sale 
of land where there has been a "part performance." 
Where there has been no "part performance" there is 
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no statutory authority permitting enforcement of the 
oral contract in contravention of the Statute of Frauds. 
And, according to Dean Pound, the equitable fraud 
theory is justified on policy grounds because it requires 
that the policy of the statute be satisfied, i.e., by taking 
of possession or other act of part performance exclusively 
referable to the contract sued upon, as well as that there 
be a strong equitable reason for enforcing the contract, 
i.e., the inability of the court to restore the status quo. 
See Pound, The Progress of the Law, 33 HARVARD 
LAW REVIEW 929 (1920) at 944. 
Hence our first contention is that there has been no 
part performance in the instant case and, hence, the 
alleged oral contract, if made, is unenforceable in equity. 
That there has been no part performance here is 
made abundantly clear by a recent and well-considered 
case decided by the Supreme Court of Washington. 
Richardson vs. Taylor Land and Livestock Co., 171 
P. (2) 703, 709 (Wash.1946) : 
"The principal elements or circumstances 
involved in. determining whether there has been 
sufficient part performance by a purchase of real 
estate under an oral contract otherwise within 
the statute of frauds, are (1) delivery and as-
sumption of actual and exclusive possession of the 
land; (2) payment or tender of the consideration, 
whether in money, other property, or services; 
and (3) the making of permanent, substantial, and 
valuable improvements referable to the contract." 
"There is a wide diversity of opinion as 
shown by the adjudicated cases, regarding' the 
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relative ilnportance of these three elements. 
"\Yhere all three of thein are united in a given 
instance, the strongest kind of case is thereby 
generally presented and, conversely, where none 
is shown, there is little to warrant a court of 
equity in decreeing specific performance. * * * 
As a n1atter of fact, in most of the cases where 
the doctrine of part performance has been suc-
cessfully invoked, it will be found that at least 
two of the enumerated elements are present." 
Another case which is directly on the point that buy-
ing other property allegedly in reliance upon an oral 
agreement to sell is not a "part performance" as to such 
agreement, and does not call for specific performance 
is Graves vs. Goldthwait, 26 N.E. 860 (Mass. 1891). 
In that case the plaintiff had an oral agreement 
with her six sisters, who were all tenants in common of 
several parcels of land, whereby she agreed to pay them 
a certain sum in consideration of their each conveying 
to her their right in one of such parcels. Five of the 
sisters conveyed their interest to plaintiff and received 
the stipulated consideration, but a sixth sister refused 
to convey her interest in the same parcel. The contention 
was made that since plain tiff had purchased five times 
as much land as she was to receive from the sixth sister, 
in reliance upon the agreement of the sixth sister to 
convey her interest, that such a purchase was or should 
be regarded as a part performance of her contract with 
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"There has been no part performance of any 
contract made with the defendant. The contracts 
which the plaintiff made with her sisters were 
several, and although she may have relied upon 
the fact that she had made contracts with all the 
tenants in common, so that, if performed by all, 
she would obtain a cornplete title to the parcel, 
neither sister was bound orally by any contract 
made by the other. When the plaintiff had pur-
chased the rights of the three sisters, she had not 
performed any portion of her contract with the 
defendant. Even if she relied on the promise of 
the defendant, and would not have purchased 
those rights but for her reliance on the perform-
ance of that promise, such purchase was not any 
part performance of her contract with the defend-
ant, but was purely a collateral matter. The rea-
soning by which a part performance of an oral 
contract for the sale of land has been held to 
take it out of the statute has never been extended 
to a partial or complete performance of collateral 
contracts." 
See, also, Knoff v. Grace, 190 P. 526 (Colo. 1920). 
In that case the plaintiff sought specific performance of 
an oral lease for the period of three years. The plaintiff 
alleged, as a basis for removing the bar of the Statute 
of Frauds, several acts done in reliance on the oral lease 
agreement. Those acts consisted of resigning other posi-
tions, forming a partnership, buying a stock of goods, 
and so forth. The court held that these acts were not 
a part performance of the lease agreement. Said the 
court: 
"Briefly expressed, the rule is that specific 
performance of an oral contract will be enforced, 
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according to the rules of equity, in favor of one 
who has partly perforn1ed it." 
""\Vhat are these rules of equity~ One of 
then1 is that part performance n1ust be part per-
fonnance; i.e. it must be the performance of 
smnething required by the contract. Von Trotha 
v. Ban1berger, 15 Colo. 1, 12, 24 Pac. 883." 
"Doing smnething because of the contract or 
in reliance on it is not enough. Jenning v. Miller, 
48 Ore. :201,85 Pac. 517." 
In the instant case there is neither possession taken 
by plaintiff, pa)J.nent of all or part of the purchase 
price, or improve1nents upon the property. There is 
certainly no dispute about this, and it is, therefore, 
apparent that there has been no part performance here. 
It is evident, then, that such cases as Hogarn v. Swayze, 
237 P. 1097 (Utah 1925) and Boelter vs. Blake, 12 N.W. 
(2) 327 (Mich. 1943), cited by plaintiff below, are not 
at all in point. The Court, therefore, should put to one 
side all those cases involving possession and payment 
or improvements on the property contracted for. They 
have no ,application at all to this case, and it but iadds 
unnecessary confusion to this case to cite them in con-
nection with any issue here involved. 
It is our contention, as stated above, that since 
there has been no part performance the plaintiff is not 
entitled to relief as against Harry Price, Jr. This posi-
tion, we think, is consistent with the case of Price v. 
Lloyd, supra, and the many cases in this state which 
follow it, as well as with any reasonable statutory con-
struction of U.C.A., Section 33-5-8 (1943). 
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Heretofore in this discussion and argument we have 
considered what is now the law in this state, that plain-
tiff must show part performance and, in addition, that 
to refuse specific performance would result in fraud, to 
be entitled to relief in this class of cases. Assuming, 
however, that this Court no longer adheres to Price v. 
Lloyd, supra, and the cases following it, and chooses 
instead to adopt as the law of this state the prior histori-
cal doctrine that oral contracts for the sale of land are 
enforceable if there is part performance or fraud, the 
plaintiff is still not entitled to relief. 
Before proceeding to discuss this issue, however, 
we respectfully urge that the Court should adhere to 
its prior decisions, following Pomeroy, to the effect that 
part performance and fraud, as distinguished from part 
performance or fraud, must be shown and proved. We 
earnestly urge, as suggested by Dean Pound, that pos-
session be required where the plaintiff is not already in 
possession so that at least the policy of the Statute of 
Frauds will be satisfied. Pound, Progress of the Law, 
33 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 929 (1920) at 940 and 
944. 
This policy consideration is particularly apropos 
in modern times when real estate transactions are nego-
tiated by real estate agents zealously seeking commis-
sions. If there is possession taken, which must inevitably 
indicate at least the consent of the vendor to that extent, 
then the understanding of the parties does not rest 
entirely in parol. If there is no possession taken, how-
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ever, the understanding is necessarily based solely on 
oral evidence-a result which the statute was clearly 
and justifiably designed to prevent. 
Assmning, however, that the Court chooses to hold 
now that part perfonnance or fraud is sufficient to 
remove the bar of the statute, the next issue is whether 
the plaintiff is defrauded if specific performance is 
denied him. We may again put to one side the question 
of part performance. As we have shown above there 
is clearly no part performance here. 
Whether any fraud would inhere in the consequence 
of refusing specific performance to plaintiff in the instant 
case, depends upon whether the plaintiff may bring 
himself within the principle of equitable estoppel. See, 
Annotation, 101 A.L.R. 923, 935 (1936); Pound, The 
Progress of the Law, supra, at 942. 
The leading case upon the question of resulting 
fraud is Glass vs. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24 (1869). This 
case is summed up in an Annotation at 101 A.L.R .. 926, 
938 (1936) as follows: 
"Indeed, the fraud which alone justifies this 
exercise of equity powers, by relief against the 
Statute of Frauds, consists in the attempt to take 
advantage of that which has been done in per-
formance or upon the faith of an agreement, 
while repudiating its obligations under cover of 
the statute." 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The first is that there must be either a representa-
tion of an existing fact or the intentional relinquishment 
of a known right. Williams vs. Barney, 224 P. (2) 1042 
(Utah 1950). See, also, Baugh vs. Darley, 184 P. (2) 
335 (Utah 1947); Vogel vs. Shaw, 294 P. 687 (Wyo. 
1930). 
The second is that the party seeking to avoid the 
bar of the statute must do an act in reliance upon the 
alleged oral contract. This is an application of the 
analogous principle underlying the theory of part per-
formance that the acts done in part performance must 
be referable to the contract. See, Burns vs. Mc0ormick1 
135 N.E. 273 (NY 1922): 
"There must be performance 'unequivocally 
referable' to the agreement, performance which 
alone and without the aid of words of promise 
is unintelligible or at least extraordinary unless 
as an incident of ownership, assured, if not exist-
ing." 
The third aspect of the fraud doctrine is that it must 
be impossible to restore the party to the condition in 
which he was when the contract was made. In other 
words, "the principle upon which specific performance 
is granted in such cases is that, by reason of the part 
performance, the relation of the parties has been changed 
and a restoration to their former condition would be 
impracticable, so that to refuse to execute the contract 
would amount ~o a fraud upon the plaintiff." See, Anno-
tation, 101 A..L.R. 926, 938 (1936). 
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This third aspect is \vell stated in a quotation from 
Pon1eroy which has heretofore been followed by this 
Court since the case of Price vs. Lloyd was decided. 
The quotation is set forth in Price vs. Lloyd, 86 P. 767, 
770 (Utah 1906), as follows: 
••\Vhen a verbal contract has been made, and 
one party has knowingly aided or permitted the 
other to go on and do acts in part performance 
of the agreement, acts done in full reliance upon 
such agreement as a valid and binding contract, 
and which would not have been done without the 
agreement, and which are of such a nature as to 
change the relation of the parties, and to prevent 
a restoration to their former condition arnd an 
adequate compensation for the loss by a legal 
judgment for damages, then it would be a virtual 
fraud in the first party to interpose the statute 
of frauds as a bar to the completion of the con-
tract, and thus to secure for himself all the benefit 
of the acts already done in part performance, 
while the other party would not only lose all 
advantage from the bargain, but would be left 
without adequate remedy for his failure or com-
pensation for what he had done in pursuance 
of it. To prevent the success of such a palpable 
fraud, equity interposes under these circum-
stances, and compels an entire completion of the 
contract by decreeing its specific execution." 
A holding under the "part performance" doctrine 
which we believe is analogous to the third aspect of this 
fraud issue, is that mere possession plus payment of the 
purchase price does not result in a fraud upon the 
vendee. This is so because the money can be restored 
to the vendee, and hence, he is put in status quo. An 
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act of part payment coupled with possession may, of 
course, amount to a significant part performance. How-
ever, in those states where the vendee must show palt 
performance and resulting fraud as distinguished from 
part performance or fraud, the payment of the purchase 
price plus possession is not sufficient to remove the bar 
of the Statute. See, Annotation, 101 A.L.R. 926, 1084 
(1936): 
"It is generally held that the reason why 
the payment of purchase money is not a suffi-
cient part performance to remove an oral con-
tract from the operation of the Statute of F'rauds 
is that the money may be recovered back by the 
vendee, so that no fraud results as to him if the 
oral contract is not enforceable." 
Another holding under the "part performance" test 
1s likewise analogous to this third issue under the 
"fraud" test. That holding has been succinctly set forth 
in the Annotation at 101 A.L.R. 926 (1936) at 1074, as 
follows: 
"The question whether or not improvements 
made by a vendee. or donee in reliance upon the 
parol agreement constitute a sufficient part per-
formance has been said to depend upon whether 
they can be reasonably compensated in damages, 
and, if they can, they are not sufficient to remove 
the agreement from the operation of the statute." 
See, also, 49 Am. Jur. STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Section 427 : 
"The partial performance must be such as 
would prevent the court from restoring the party 
performing to the situation in which he was 
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zchen the agreement 'Was made. It must be pre-
judicial to the performing party and place him 
in a situation which does not lie in compensa-
tion • • • ." 
In the instant case, then, where in any event fraud 
must be shown because part performance is lacking, 
the third issue is solely whether the status quo may be 
restored. 
Plaintiff has failed to meet even one of these three 
requirements or elements essential to establish equitable 
estoppel. As we shall hereafter show, there is not a 
sufficient representation of existing fact, there is no 
reliance, and plaintiff is in no sense defrauded if spe-
cific performance is denied him in this case. 
(1) 
We will discuss first the issue of whether there is 
here a representation of an existing fact or the inten-
tional abandonment of a known right. This issue need 
not detain us long because the testimony relied upon 
by plaintiff (R. 87, 88) indicates only that Harry Price 
manifested his intention that he did not intend to pur-
chase, and had no objection if the plaintiff purchased, 
the Terry property. As this Court has recently held, such 
a representation is wholly insufficient to form the basis 
of an equitable estoppel. Williams v. Barney, supra. 
Moreover, any statements made by Harry Price relate 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(2) 
We pass now to the second issue, that of reliance. 
In this connection we repeat again that the issue of 
reliance under the doctrine of equitable estoppel is simi-
lar to the requirement under the "part performance" 
test, that the acts done in part performance must be 
"exclusively referable" to the contract sued upon. 
And, under the theory of equitable estoppel or part 
performance, the act or acts done, whether in reliance 
or in performance, must be done as an incident of own-
ership "assured, if not existing." 
Or, to state the question differently, if the vendee 
did not have, nor was certain to obtain, the vendor's land, 
at the time the act was done, that act is insufficient. 
Thus, in a recent case decided by the Supreme Court 
of Minnesota, it was held that there was no reliance 
where the act alleged to have been done in reliance on 
an oral contract for the sale of land was done prior to 
the time that the vendee attempted to negotiate for a 
contract. Ruble vs. Ruble, 47 N.W. (2) 420 (Minn. 1951). 
See, also, the Utah cases of Price vs. Lloyd, 86 P. 867, 
870 (Utah 1906); Hargreaves vs. Burton, 206 P. 262, 267 
(Utah 1922). 
Tested by this well-settled rule, plaintiff's case must 
fail on the issue of reliance. 
This is apparent from plaintiff's own testimony 
which has previously been referred to (R. 242, 245). 
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There is no question in this case but that the act 
relied upon as taking the instant case out of the Statute 
of Frauds was the purchase of the Terry property. That 
is the only act pleaded or proved in the Court below. 
And, of course, the plaintiff has the burden of proving 
the nature and extent of the act or acts allegedly creat-
ing an estoppel. 
It is also without dispute that the Terry property 
was purchased on October 5, 1950. On that very same 
day, however, plaintiff testified that he gave a check 
for $19,000 (Ex. N) to Hansen and told Hansen that he 
had "one week" to conclude a transaction with Harry 
Price for that figure (R. 242, 245). In other words, 
plaintiff purchased the Terry property at a time when 
he knew perfectly well he had no contract with Price 
to sell for the $19,000.00 figure. Plaintiff was seeking, 
at that tune, to obtain a contract. He bought the Terry 
property before he made the $19,000 cash offer, and 
this fact brings this case directly under the facts in 
the case of Ruble v. Ruble, supra. It is, therefore, clear 
beyond question that plaintiff knew that he was taking 
his chances on getting a contract with Price when the 
Terry contract was consurnmated. Plaintiff, on October 
5, 1950, did not think and had no reason whatever to 
think that he was "assured" of getting the Price property 
for $19,000 cash or at all. 
If there was any "reliance" at all here, a fact which 
we very much doubt, that reliance could only be based 
on the proposed three way trade arrangement by which 
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Prices were to convey to Mollerup and Mollerup was, 
in turn, to convey to respondent, Ravarino. We point 
out in this connection that the deed running from 
Mollerup as grantor to respondent as grantee (Ex. 0) 
had been signed by the Mollerups on October 4, 1950. 
This is just one day prior to the date, October 5th, when 
the Terry deal was consummated. Having that deed 
(Ex. 0) before him at the time the Terry deal was con-
summated, Hansen probably thought that he could rely 
on it. Hansen was entirely wrong even in this, however, 
because at this time difficulties with the title on the 
Mollerup property were still being ironed out (R. 147). 
(3) 
We pass now to the third issue, namely, whether 
plaintiff will be defrauded unless specific performance 
is granted in his favor. 
Here the answer must also be in the negative. 
The meaning of "fraud" in this context, as we have 
previously pointed out, is whether plaintiff can be re-
stored to the position he was in prior to the alleged 
contract. That is, the question is whether or not the 
status quo can be restored. If the status quo can be 
restored, clearly no fraud will result if specific perform-
ance is not decreed here. 
In a few states, if there has been a part perform-
ance, it may be immaterial that plaintiff can be restored 
to his former position. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. Eidsmo, 
23 N.W. (2) 362 (Minn. 1946). Where there has been 
no part performance, however, as in the instant case, 
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the authorities all agree that specific performance should 
be denied where the status quo can be restored. This 
is so because if the status quo can be restored the plain-
tiff is not defrauded if specific performance is denied 
him. 
As we have previously pointed out, the only act 
claimed or proved by plaintiff as a change of position 
is his purchase of the Terry property. Paragraph 4 of 
the amended answer of Harry Price, as well as Para-
graph 4 of the amended answer of Mrs. Price and Mrs. 
Parr (R. 9, 12) contain offers on the part of all appel-
lants to purchase the Terry property from plaintiff for 
what he paid for it. All appellants thus offer to place 
plaintiff in the precise position he was in prior tol any 
of the negotiations here involved. In other words, 
defendants have, prior to the trial of this lawsuit, been 
ready and willing to relieve plain tiff of the consequences 
of his purchase of the Terry property. 
In view of these offers by all appellants to restore 
the status quo, and in view of the undisputed fact that 
there is no part performance here, the decision by the 
Court below flies right in the teeth of the statute·, and 
it cannot be justified on the basis of a single historical 
precedent. See 49 Am. Jur. STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Section 427 : 
"Equity has no concern in cases of part per-
formance except to prevent the perpetration of 
a fraud. That is the only ground which can 
justify its interference. Otherwise, the exercise 
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of its jurisdiction for the practical annulment of 
the statute would be merely bare usurpation." 
Respondent argued in the Court below that the pur-
chase by the defendants of the Terry property would 
not restore the status quo because plaintiff loses the 
benefit of the bargain. The fact that the plaintiff loses 
the benefit of the bargain, however, as we have pointed 
out already, cannot be considered on this issue. 
See, Peterson vs. Nichols, 188 P. 498 (Wash. 1920). 
In this case a trade of land by Nichols in return for a 
store and other land was involved. It was oral, except 
that most of the Deeds and Bills of Sale had been 
executed proving what the arrangement was. Nichols 
went into possession under an oral agreement that he 
should operate the store and deposit the profits at a 
certain bank. When the deal went through, the money 
so deposited was to become the property of Nichols. 
Nichols went into possession of the store and contracted 
for the purchase of a large quantity of goods and also 
purchased insurance in reliance on the contract. When 
negotiations broke off, Nichols sought specific perform-
ance. The lower Court granted specific performance, 
but was reversed by the Supreme Court. The Court held 
that the acts done in reliance on the contract were insuffi-
cient to constitute such a change of position that Nichols 
would be defrauded unless the contract were enforced. 
This was so because the money deposited in the bank 
was sufficient to compensate him for all the expenditures 
he had made in reliance on the contract. The Court said, 
at Page 499: 
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••Respondent contends his situation was mate-
rially changed by his part performance of the 
contract. He entered into possession, and con-
tracted for additional insurance and also for 
nun1erous bills of goods in his own name. If these 
goods were received, they went into the business, 
and it is not difficult to deduct the amount of all 
of them from the funds still in the Union Bank. 
There is no showing that these bills exceeded in 
amount such funds in the bank, nor that it would 
be impossible to recover any amount for such 
purchases from the appellants. Respondent's con-
tention that he was contracting for a going busi-
ness in which he expected to earn money far 
beyond the value of his services alone can be of no 
weight in the consideration of this point. His 
situation on account of the part performance 
as changed from what it had been before, not his 
anticipated situation after the contract should be 
consummated, is the thing that governs." 
And see, also, Baldridge vs. Centgraf, 108 P. 83, 85 
(Kan. 1910), where the Court holds that possession must 
be taken under such circumstances "that its relinquish-
ment involves a disadvantage apart from the mere loss 
of the benefits of the bargain." 
See, also, Price vs. Lloyd, 86 P. 767, 770 (Utah 1906) : 
"Equity will. not enforce a mere voluntary 
agreement or mere parol gift of land. In addition 
thereto, equity demands a valuable consideration, 
and also a showing that in consequence of the 
gift the donee has done something, whereby a 
refusal to grant specific performance is not merely 
a denial of rights which were intended to be 
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That these cases are sound law, and that enforce-
ment of an oral contract where part performance is 
lacking and where the vendee can be put in status quo, 
is directly in conflict with the Statute of Frauds, we can 
illustrate by two brief examples: 
1. Suppose A orally agrees to convey real estate 
to B, and B does nothing thereafter, by way of part 
performance, or otherwise. It is evident that B has lost 
the benefit of the bargain, but B is certainly not entitled 
to specific performance since his oral undertaking is void 
under the Statute of Frauds. If Courts were to hold 
otherwise, obviously the effect would be to write the 
Statute of Frauds off the statute books. 
2. Suppose that A orally agrees to convey to B 
the same real estate, and that B thereafter buys some 
other property for $1,800.00, allegedly in reliance upon 
that oral agreement. If A then reimburses B for B's 
expenditure of $1,800.00, B has then lost only the bargain, 
and the situation is the same as in Example 1 set forth 
above. In other words, B has been restored to precisely 
the same position he was in at the time the agreement was 
allegedly made. And Example 2 represents the exact 
facts in the case at bar. 
There is another factor, which is relevant here by 
way of analogy, that should be mentioned. 
As we have heretofore pointed out, there is no 
"fraud," as distinguished from part performance, in 
those instances where the vendee pays the purchase 
price for the property allegedly contracted for. This 
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1s so, as indicated above, because the 1noney can be 
refunded to the plaintiff. It would seem to us that, a 
fortiori, money expended by the plaintiff to purchase 
property other than the property contracted for, and 
for the purchase of whieh the plaintiff is reimbursed, 
cannot result in the perpetration of a fraud upon the 
plaintiff. 
In the former case the vendor has received a benefit 
for which he is quasi-contractually liable, while, in the 
latter case the vendor is exceeding his legal duty in 
offering to restore the status quo. See Baugh v. Darley, 
184 P. (2) 335 (Utah 1947). 
~Ioreover, as we have pointed out, if, under the 
analogous part perforn1ance test, the improvements made 
by plaintiff on the defendant's property may be com-
pensated in money, the plaintiff is not defrauded. 'So 
here, where the money spent by plaintiff in no sense 
benefits the defendants, the restoration of that money 
to plaintiff prevents that fraud which alone justifies the 
intervention of a court of equity. 
Indeed, if the defendants are compelled to sell all 
their property notwithstanding that they are ready and 
willing to restore the status quo, it is they who are de-
frauded rather than plaintiff. This is so, in addition 
to further reasons hereafter stated, because the defend-
ants are compelled to sell 100 square rods of property 
against their will because the plaintiff has purchased 
property slightly in excess of four square rods. No 
equity court has ever before permitted the tail to wag 
the dog so far ! 
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POINT III. 
THE AGREEMENT ENFORCED BY THE COURT BE-
LOW IS CONTRARY TO THE UNDERSTANDING AND IN-
TENTION OF PLAINTIFF AND ALL DEFENDANTS AND 
IS, THEREFORE, UNENFORCEABLE IN EQUITY, AND THE 
FAILURE OF THE COURT BELOW TO MAKE A FINDING 
UPON THIS ISSUE CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Before discussing this third point in detail, we will 
point out one fundamental proposition of law. We direct 
the Court's attention to this proposition at the outset 
because it is our primary contention on this third point 
that the lower Court has misconceived its role in the 
instant case. 
The function of a Court of equity in this kind of 
case is to ascertain the intention of the parties. If the 
parties mutually agreed to the terms of a contract then 
a Court of equity may be justified in enforcing it. It is 
clearly, however, neither the duty nor the function of a 
Court of equity to enforce a contract which the parties 
never intended to make. It is error for an equity court 
to make a contract for the parties and then attempt 
to enforce that contract. 
Shaver vs. Wickwire, 166 N.E. 458, 460 (Ill. 1929): 
"A Court has no authority to compel a party 
to do something different from that which by his 
contract he has agreed to do. In specific perform-
ance it is the province of the Court to enforce 
the contract which the parties have made, and 
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See, also, 49 Atn. Jur., SPECIFIC PERFORM~ 
AN CE, Sect. 22: 
"\Vhenever it appears that material matters 
are not clear, certain, and complete, but are left 
by the parties so obscure or undefined that the 
court cannot say whether or not the minds of 
the parties met upon all the essential particulars, 
or if they did, the court cannot say exactly upon 
what substantial ter1ns they agreed, the case is 
not one for specific performance. Equity cannot 
make a new contract for the parties, but must 
enforce the contract according to its terms or not 
at all; the court will not make a contract for the 
parties or supply any material stipulation thereof. 
If a decree of specific performance should be 
entered in such a case, it would be uncertain 
whether the court was enforcing the contract the 
parties had agreed upon, or whether it was mak-
ing a new agreement for them, and decreeing 
its execution." 
In the instant case it is true there is a writing, Ex. 
E, upon which now appears the signatures of Mrs. Price 
and Mrs. Parr. The inquiry of the Court should not and 
cannot stop there however. This is so because the remedy 
of specific performance is not granted as a matter of 
right but only as a matter of discretion after all the cir-
cumstances and equities of the case have been considered 
and justify it. 
49 .A.m. Jur., SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, Sect. 8: 
"The remedy of specific performance will be 
granted or withheld by the court according to 
the equities of the situation as disclosed by a just 
consideration of all the circumstances of the par-
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ticular case, and no positive rule can be laid 
down by which the action of the court can be 
determined in all cases. The granting of such 
relief is controlled by the established principles 
and rules constituting the body of equity juris-
prudence. Accordingly, the rule is well settled 
that equitable relief by way of specific perform-
ance does not follow as a matter of course merely 
by establishing the existence and validity of the 
contract involved, and it is not decreed as of right 
by showing that an oral contract has been partly 
performed. Specific performance is not a matter 
of absolute right even though a legal right to 
damages for breach of the contract may exist, 
and' it may be refused even though the defense 
is not such as would warrant the rescission of the 
contract." 
Indeed, even if it were the case here that the terms 
of the agreement enforced by the Court below, Ex. E, 
were certain, clear, and unambiguous upon their face, 
specific performance is not necessarily to be granted. 
Holsz vs. Stephen, 200 N.E. 601 (Ill.1936): 
"Whether the specific performance of a con-
t 
tract will be granted depends in a large measure 
on the facts in the case. Even where the terms of 
the contract are clear, certain and unambiguous, 
specific performance is not a matter of right, but 
rests in the sound discretion of the court to be 
determined from all the facts and circumstances." 
With this basic proposition in mind, we proceed to 
a more detailed discussion of the law applicable on this 
point. 
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'Ye will divide the discussion into three parts, each 
pointing out a separate reason why Ex. E is, as a matter 
of law, unenforceable against any of the appellants. 
These reasons are : 
1. Because the defendant, Harry Price, as we have 
shown above, is not bound by Ex. E, the other two 
defendants, :Jlrs. Parr and ~Irs. Price, cannot be so 
bound. 
2. Exhibit E is on its face too uncertain and 
ambiguous to be specifically enforced, and extrinsic 
evidence does not clear up the ambiguity because that 
evidence conclusively shows that Ex. E is contrary to 
the understanding of the parties. 
3. Even if Ex. E were clear on its face, it cannot 
be enforced here because it is basically inconsistent with 
the oral and documentary evidence disclosing the true 
contemplated agreement of all the parties. 
We will discuss each of these contentions separately. 
(1) 
The contentions made under this Part III are applic-
able to all of the defendants. Parts I and II above were 
applicable to defendant Harry Price alone. We dealt 
with the legal points under Points I and II initially, 
because if Harry Price is not bound neither are the two 
women defendants, :Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr. Hence, 
since we have shown that Harry Price cannot be com-
pelled to pe-rform in accordance with the terms of Ex. E, 
it follows that the women also cannot be so compelled. 
6-3 
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This conclusion necessarily follows because, if a court 
were to hold otherwise, it would be making a new con-
tract for the parties. 
This contention is fully supported by a recent case 
decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Axe vs. 
Potts, 37 A. 2d 572 (Pa. 1944). 
In this case real estate was owned as tenants in 
common by three persons. The property was listed for 
sale with a corporation which was engaged in the real 
estate brokerage business. That corporation prepared 
a written agreement calling for a purchase price of 
$15,000.00. The contract was executed by plaintiff and 
forwarded to the individual defendants for the purpose 
of securing their assent. Two of the three co-owners 
signed the agreement. The third did not do so. In 
addition, plaintiff had paid $1,000.00 to defendants on 
the purchase price. The Court held that the third de-
fendant who failed to sign was not bound by reason of 
the Statute of Frauds. The Court held further that 
plaintiff could not have specific performance as against 
the defendants who signed to the extent of their joint 
interests. To allow specific performance in such a case, 
said the Court, would be to make a new contract for the 
parties. 
This case 1s controlling here because it is clear 
beyond question that the women defendants never, at 
any time, intended to convey the interest of Harry Price 
in the warehouse property. Nor did they intend to con-
vey a half interest or convey any interest at all in that 
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property unless Harry Price also joined in the contract 
and conveyance. They also clearly intended that no act 
of theirs should be binding unless Harry Price joined 
with them. This is clear from ~Irs. Parr's testimony 
(R. 191, 193) to the effect that she would not sign unless 
she was assured by ~lr. Hansen that Harry Price's 
signature was required to n1ake the instrument legal. 
This is confirn1ed by :Jlr. Ed Jensen (R. 210) who testi-
fied that Hansen and also both women told him this 
occurred, and it is not denied by Lewis Hansen (R. 84, 
122, 123). 
This was also the definite understanding of plaintiff. 
Plaintiff knew that the property was owned by Harry 
Price and Mrs. Parr, and plaintiff at all times sought 
the assent of both these appellants. Thus, where it is 
the clear understanding of all defendants that one shall 
not convey without the rest, or where the plaintiff knows 
that the property is held jointly there can be no specific 
performance as against either the defendants who signed 
or against those who did not sign or whose signature 
was void. 
See, also, Stout vs. Porritt, 229 N.W. 409 (Mich. 
1930); Corby vs. Drew, 36 A. 827 (N.J. Eq. 1897); Olson 
vs. Lovell, 27 P. 7 65 (Cal. 1891). 
Particularly is this true where the co ... owners are 
husband and wife or brother and sister, and thus would 
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Jackson vs. Torrence, 23 P. 695 (Cal. 1890); Ober-
mark vs. Cla,rk, 114 So. 135 (Ala. 1927); Rose vs. Hender-
son, 59 So. 138 (Fla. 1912). 
See, generally, Annotation 154 A.L.R. 767 (1945). 
(2) 
Since Harry Price was not bound to convey in 
accordance with Ex. E, it follows that the case against 
the women must also fail for the reason just mentioned. 
There are, however, other reasons which preclude equi-
table relief in this case. This second point and the 
point which follows both deal with these additional 
reasons. 
Exhibit E is so uncertain and indefinite on its face 
that it cannot be specifically enforced. 
See 49 Am. Jur., SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 
Sect. 22: 
"The contract must be free from doubt, 
vagueness, and ambiguity, so as to leave nothing 
to conjecture or to be supplied by the court. 
It must be sufficiently certain and definite in its 
terms to leave no reasonable doubt as to what the 
parties intended, and no reasonable doubt of the 
specific thing equity is called upon to have per-
formed, and it must be sufficiently certain as to its 
terms so that the court may enforce it as actually 
made by the parties. A greater degree of cer-
tainty is required for specific performance in 
equity than is necessary to establish a contract 
as the basis of an action at law for damages. 
Courts of law will grant relief in damages for 
the breach of many agreen1en ts which would not 
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be regarded in equity as sufficiently definite and 
certain to warrant a decree for their specific per-
formance, since an action at law is founded on 
Inere nonperfor1nance by the defendant, and this 
negative act nmy often be established without 
deterinining all the terms of the con tract with 
exactness.'' 
See, generally, Annotation 65 A.L.R. 102 (1930). 
A discussion of this point requires a specific refer-
ence to Ex. E. The description of the property therein 
contained is : 
""1-LOT 165x165 at 235 W. 5th So." 
This description purports to set forth three factors 
serving to identify the property to be conveyed. These 
factors are the number of lots, the measurement or 
dimensions of the property, and its address or location. 
Of the three factors identifying property in this 
description, two of them are erroneous according to 
plaintiff's own assertion now as to the property to be 
conveyed. As set forth in Paragraph 2 of the Findings 
of Fact (R. 249-250), the findings there set forth two 
descriptions covering two lots owned by respondents 
and only one of these is "at 235 W. 5th So." and not 
"1-lot" as contained in this description. 
It is shocking to us, and we think will be to the 
Court, that this obvious inconsistency is attempted to be 
cleared up by adding after these two descriptions in the 
complaint (R. 1) and in the Findings (R. 249, 250) thus: 
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"Said property is also known as a certain 
Lot 165 feet by 165 feet at 235 West Fifth South 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah." 
This statement is not only entirely unsupported, but 
totally misleading. "Also known" to whom as being "a 
certain lot~" "Also known" to whom as being "at 235 
West Fifth South Street~" There is not a word of evi-
dence to indicate that the property described by these 
two descriptions (R. 249) was ever known otherwise than 
as written out in the abstracts, and in the deeds and 
decrees by which the appellants' predecessors, and them-
selves acquired these properties. As shown by these 
abstracts (Exs. A and B) these properties were acquired 
at different times from different persons. They have 
different character of buildings, they have distinctly 
separate numbers, the warehouse being at 225 West 
and the residence at 235 West, and they are separated 
by a fence (R. 234). Furthermore, the street number 
stated in the above description, "235 W." is completely 
inconsistent because this is the residence property and 
not the property contemplated to be traded or ever 
considered or appraised in the transaction contemplated. 
The property at 225 is the warehouse property con-
sidered for exchange (173, 174, 191). 
The dimensions in the description are alone con-
sistent with plaintiff's present theory, and yet, it is as 
clear as can be that these dimensions are the one factor 
that meant nothing at all to these women defendants 
who alone at any time signed Ex. E (R. 198). They had 
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no idea whether the warehouse lot was 6x10 rods, as it is 
in fact, or 10x10 rods, as Inentioned in Ex. E. 
Thu~, the two factors that are n1ost significant to 
the women, the number of "1-lot" and the address, "235 
W. 5th So.," are fundarnentally inconsistent with the 
designation of the 1neasure1nents of the property set 
forth in Ex. E. Reading Ex. E alone, then, on its face 
there are substantial doubts raised, to say the least, as 
to the property to which that agreement applies. 
A description which is inconsistent with itself in 
regard to those matters most familiar to the layman 
who examines it is certainly not so "clear, certain, and 
unambiguous" as to "leave nothing to conjecture." 
Hargreaves vs. Burton, 206 P. 262, 265 (Utah 1922). 
And the authorities hold the contract may be uncertain 
and ambiguous because the subject matter of the contract 
is not adequately identified therein. 49 Am. Jur., 'SPE-
CIFIC PERFORniANCE, Sect. 26; Alexander vs. Alex-
ander, 58 P. 2d 1265, 1270 (Ore. 1936); Gilman vs. 
Brunton, 161 P. 835 (Wash. 1916). 
Moreover, a resort to the evidence not only empha-
sizes the indefiniteness and the inconsistency of plain-
tiff's attempted claim, but shows the gross inequity of it. 
This is so because it is without contradiction that 
the women considered that only one lot, the lot containing 
the warehouse, was involved in the proposed deal at all 
(R. 191, 174), and they were corroborated in this respect 
by Mr. Schluter (R. 222). Mr. Schluter, employed to 
appraise the properties to be exchanged, appraised only 
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the warehouse lot, having been told that that was the 
only property involved in any proposed contractual 
arrangement. Regardless of what was the understanding 
of plaintiff, and he has not said but signed two docu-
ments (Exs. E and 2) offering to buy "1-LOT" at 
one address, it is clear that the women defendants, Mrs. 
Price and Mrs. Parr, thought that only one lot was 
involved in any suggested contract. 
Not only did the women have this understanding 
that one lot only was involved here, but it appears to 
have been the understanding of Hansen, the real estate 
agent, also. Because when he first started his attempt to 
initiate any transaction on this property he drew up 
Ex. 2. This is dated either July 8th or August 8, 1950. 
It is also an Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement, 
except that this time the offeror, Ravarino, signed it 
first and put up a deposit according to the way in which 
this document is intended to operate. 
And, in this document, and after both lots had been 
indicated by their separate addresses on the listing card 
(Ex. D), as "located 225 235 West 5th So." Hansen wrote 
into Ex. 2 the same description as in Ex. E, to-wit: 
"1-LOT 165'x165' at 235-West 5th So." 
It is difficult to believe that with both of these lots 
listed under their separate numbers he would draw 
this description declaring only one lot and one number 
if he thought these defendants were contemplating both. 
Furthermore, Hansen was familiar with this proper-
ty and from the time that he obtained a similar offer 
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on a si1nilar Earnest .Money document signed by Rav-
arino, August 8, 1950 (Ex. 3) to purchase the Terry 
strip, he had been negotiating for the purchase of that 
strip. He also drew the deed (Ex. M) by which the 
Terrys conveyed this strip to respondent and this strip 
does not touch the property at :235 or extend behind any 
portion of it so as to be usable as a right-of-way thereto 
(~35). It only extends along the rear of the warehouse 
property at 2:25. It is again apparent that if Hansen 
had intended to acquire the residence property he would 
have made the trackage right-of-way available to serve it. 
There was no meeting of the minds with reference 
to this issue. Further, the contract sued upon remains 
indefinite, uncertain and ambiguous. As we shall furth~r 
point out under our third contention, infra, there are 
other substantial points of disagreement as well. 
Here again, then, it was plainly erroneous for the 
Court below to intervene and make a contract for the 
parties which they did not themselves intend to make. 
(3) 
Even if Ex. E were clear and definite on its face, 
however, there are other facts and circumstances which 
an equity court is not free to ignore and which preclude 
any equitable relief in plaintiff's favor under the auth-
orities above cited and under the authorities to be cited. 
A plaintiff cannot, in a court of equity, extract from 
a mass of documents representing the whole of the tran-
saction being considered by the parties, one document, 
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basically inconsistent with the rest, and attempt to 
enforce that document as a separate binding contract. 
This principle is aptly illustrated by a case decided 
by the Supreme Court of Kansas. 
Haston vs. Citizens State Bank of Sterling, 297 P. 
1061 (Kan. 1931). 
In that case the plaintiff had becmne indebted to the 
defendant bank, and the indebtedness was represented 
by promissory notes. The defendant bank was pressing 
plaintiff for the payment of these notes. In order to 
work out a settlement, it was decided that the plaintiff 
should convey certain lands to defendant in satisfaction 
of the notes. As a part of this transaction the plaintiff 
was to have three years to redeem the property con-
veyed. In the interim the defendant bank agreed that 
the plaintiff could have the opportunity to rent the land 
from defendant. The land to be conveyed by plaintiff 
had certain mortgages upon it. It was further agreed 
that the bank should be reimbursed by plaintiff for any 
of these mortgages that it paid off. Any mortgages 
that remained unpaid at the time of the redemption 
of the property by plaintiff were to remain outstanding, 
and any reconveyance to plaintiff was to be subject to 
these outstanding and unpaid mortgages. 
In executing this transaction, five documents were 
prepared and executed by the parties. One of the docu-
ments, the one sought to be specifically enforced by 
plaintiff, was an executed bond for· deed. This provided 
for the redemption of the property, and as written it 
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provided that upon reden1ption the defendant bank was 
obligated to convey to plaintiff a fee sll:nple free of liens 
and mortga.ge8. This bond for deed was inconsistent with 
the other four document8, as well as with the understand-
rug of the parties. This was so because·, upon redemption, 
the defendant bank was intended to be actually obligated 
to convey only the equity in the property subject to the 
mortgages which had not been discharged by the bank. 
The plaintiff tendered the redemption price and 
demanded a warranty deed free and clear of encum-
brances. 'Vhen the bank refused to execute such a deed 
the plaintiff sought specific performance. 
The Court denied plaintiff the relief asked by him. 
''The defendant bank defended upon the theory that 
there were omissions and mistakes in the writing of the 
bond, and that it did not express the entire contract nor 
yet the intention of the parties." The Court sustained 
this defense. Said the Court at 1065 : 
"All of these papers, five in number, con-
stituted a single transaction and all were made 
without specific reference to each other, but mani-
festly all were evidences of the contract made. 
The bond for a deed, it is manifest, did not express 
the full agreements of the parties as evidenced 
by the other writings that were made as a. part 
of the transaction, but that by mistake it was filled 
out on a particular form without covering the 
provision of the entire contract and contrary to 
the intention in Inaking the contract." 
The cited case is a direct authority to the effect that 
a plaintiff cannot secure specific performance of a docu-
ment which is inconsistent with the several documents 
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which make up the whole transaction contemplated by 
the parties. That case is directly in point here not only 
because we make the same defense that was there made, 
but also because the instant case presents a closely 
analogous factual situation. And when such a factual 
situation is presented it is the duty of an equity court 
to consider all the documents and circumstances and 
to ascertain from then1 the true contract intended by 
the parties. If the equity court fails to do this it inevi-
tably will end up by making a contract for the parties. 
The lower: Court has not given due consideration to 
all the documents received in evidence or to the evidence 
as indicative of the transaction intended by the parties. 
No finding has been made which adjudicates the effect 
of the se·veral documents that were proposed as the con-
tract to be signed up in late October, and which are 
fundamentally inconsistent with the contract sued upon. 
These documents, which constitute the bulk of the docu-
mentary evidence in this case, are Exs. J, F, G, H, and 0. 
No reference is expressly made to a single one of these 
exhibits in the findings approved by the Court below. 
Paragraph 12 of the Findings of Fact does not cover 
this issue. This finding says that the "entire transac-
tion" was discussed "on or about the first part of N ovem-
ber, 1950" (R. 254), and that thereafter defendants re-
fused to execute the "Warranty Deed which had been 
prepared and submitted to them and submitted by 
defendants to their counsel for his approval." The find-
ing does not, however, explicitly identify the document 
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referred to. So, also, Paragraph S of the Findings of 
Fact does not deal with this in1portant issue. That find-
ing :state:s that "doctunents of conveyance were prepared 
and submitted to defendants and by them, referred to 
~Ir. Ed Jensen, attorney for defendants, for approval." 
(R. :25:2). Here again the '"docmnents" referred to are 
not expres:sly identified, and hence it is apparent that 
the Court has not made a finding with regard to the 
effect to be given them. 
In short, there is no finding of fact at all that pur-
ports to deal with the effect of all the "documents" drawn 
up in order to carry out the true agreement of the 
parties. Nor is there any finding which purports to recon-
cile those '"documents" with the contract sued upon. 
Paragraphs 3 and 5 (R. 8, 9, 11, 12) of the amended 
answers of all defendants tendered an issue with regard 
to whether or not the contract sued upon represented 
the actual agreement made by the parties. These answers 
allege that the true contract that was being negotiated 
with the defendants was the contract represented by the 
Exs. J, F, G, H, and 0. In addition to these allegations, 
the oral argument made to the Court below stressed 
primarily the fact that on the record, the plaintiffs had 
pleaded one contract and proved another that is incon-
sistent with the contract pleaded. The failure of the 
Court below to make a finding on this material and vital 
l'!i, issue alone requires reversal here. Baker vs. Hatch, 257 
~ P. 673, 676 (Utah 1927); West vs. Standard Fuel Co., 17 
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P. 2d 292, 293 (Utah 1932); Talbot vs. Anderson, 15 P. 
2d 350, 352 (Utah 1932); Jesse M. Chase vs. Leonard, 
203 P. 2d 600, 603 (Ida. 1949). 
This is particularly true here because the Court 
failed to consider one of the circumstances which neces-
sarily renders relief in plaintiff's favor inequitable. 
Remmers vs. Ciciliot, 138 P. 2d 306 (Cal. App. 1943). 
This is also particularly true here because the Court 
failed to find on an issue tendered as an affirmativf; 
defense. Hinmarn vs. Conard, 58 P. 2d 732 (Cal. App. 
1936) ; Linde vs. Emmick, 61 P. 2d 338 (Cal. App. 1936); 
San Jose Abstract & Ins. Co. vs. Elliott, 240 P. 2d 41, 47 
(Cal. A pp. 1952). 
If the lower Court had dealt in its finding of fact 
with the issues tendered by Paragraphs 3 and 5 of 
defendants' amended answers, the finding could only be 
that Ex. E, the agreement sued upon, was inconsistent 
with Exs. J, F, G, H, and 0, and with the testimony of 
Hansen and Rich (R. 80, 91, 143, 144, 149, 155, 156), 
respondent's witnesses, and all the evidence in the case. 
See: Duncan vs. Hemmelwright, 186 P. 2d 965, 969 (Utah 
1947); Dahl vs. Cayias, 174 P. 2d 430, 433 (Utah 1946). 
Because the Court may choose to make its own find-
ings on this issue, we feel that it is very significant to 
point out why the "documents" referred to in the find-
ings are not there specifically identified. Dahl vs. Cayias, 
174 P. 2d 430, 433 (Utah 1946); U.R.C.P. 75(h). If those 
76 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
docwnents were identified that would too obviously re-
veal that they are wholly inconsistent with the agreenwnt 
sued upon. 
For exmnple, Paragraph 12 of the Findings of Flact 
refers to the ··entire transaction" as being repre·sented 
by a "\Yarranty Deed which had been prepared and 
submitted by defendants to their counsel" for his ap-
proval ( R. :25±). 
There were only three warranty deeds prepared, 
Exs. G, H, and 0. Rich testified that only two, Exs. G 
and H, were submitted to J\Ir. Jensen (R. 145, 146). All 
these deeds are inconsistent with Ex. E. Exhibits G and 
H are warranty deeds running from appellants, as 
grantors, to A. C. ~Iollerup, as grantee. Exhibit 0 is 
an executed deed from A. C. Mollerup, as grantor, to 
respondent, as grantee. These deeds are wholly irrecon-
cilable with Ex. E. There is no deed whatsoever in, or 
referred to, in evidence that runs from defendants to 
plaintiff. There is no deed which is consistent in any 
respect with Ex. E. 
So, also, Paragraph 8 of the Findings of Fact states 
that "documents of conveyance" were prepared after 
September 21, 1950, and likewise submitted to defendants' 
counsel ( R. 252). The only documents prepared sub-
sequent to September 21st, were Exs. F, G, H, and 0, 
all of which are inconsistent with the contract here sued 
upon. These, with the exception of 0, were the docu-
ments, and only documents, according to plaintiff's own 
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witnesses that were ever submitted to Attorney Ed 
Jensen at any time (R. 145, 146). 
Because these documents necessarily represent and 
reflect the "entire transaction" referred to in Paragraph 
12 of the Findings of Fact, the last sentence of that 
finding makes no sense at all to us. That last sentence 
states that defendants have refused to execute a con-
veyance "to plaintiffs." (R. 254). The preceding sen-
tence, when clarified by resort to the evidence, indicates 
that there was to be no conveyance of any kind made 
to plaintiff by defendants. Indeed, when the warranty 
deed referred to in Paragraph 12 of the findings is iden-
tified according to the evidence in this case, that deed 
provides for a conveyance by defendants to A. C. Mol-
lerup! This was the only deed Mr. Price was ever invited 
to sign; and no other deed by appellants was ever con-
sidered by anyone. 
All these documents that we have just mentioned and 
Exs. J and J-1, represent the exchange and trade that 
we pleaded as the true contract considered by the 
parties. That arrangement provided that the defendants 
were to convey their property to A. C. Mollerup and 
receive an $18,000.00 credit for it. They were, in addi-
tion, to pay $17,000.00 in monthly payments, and they 
were to receive from A. C. Mollerup real estate held by 
him. A. C. Mollerup was expected to then convey the 
Price property to Ravarino and receive the cash con-
sideration from him. Defendants had nothing to do with 
this cash deal. 
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Frmn a consideration of these documents, which 
illustrate the true eontract involved, we can see that a 
dilenuua confronted plaintiff. If the Findings of Fact 
fail to consider this evidence, a material issue would be 
omitted which it was clearly the duty of the equity Court 
to consider and pass upon. If this documentary evidence 
is dealt with and a finding n1ade upon it, the finding that 
would have to be made could not sustain the decree in 
favor of plaintiff because that evidence discloses that 
the actual agreement negotiated is basically inconsistent 
with the contract here atte1upted to be enforced. 
The plaintiff's atten1pt to slip between the horns of 
this dilemma must fail. The Findings of Fact proposed 
by plaintiff and adopted by the Court do not go far 
enough to result in a finding upon this issue. And yet, 
they go too far because they reveal, with the other 
undisputed evidence, the only arrangement and agree-
ment that was being considered by all the parties con-
cerned. 
By reference to the statement of facts above set 
forth, this Court will get an accurate picture of the 
-:_ agreement upon which the negotiations were based. The 
Court will see clearly that as early as August of 1950, 
any cash sale of the Price property to Ravarino was 
, clearly out of the question. 
Paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact is fatally 
defective because it does not recognize this undisputed 
fact. From and after August, 1950, it was never a ques-
tion of "more money" but only of whether a satisfactory 
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trade arrangement could be worked out. Hansen, him-
self, says this (R. 77, 105). 
All the pertinent documents, the testimony of plain-
tiff's witnesses, Rich and Hansen, as well as the testi-
Inony of defendants show conclusively that a trade 
arrangement alone was attempted to be worked out (R. 
105, 134, 155, 156) 0 
One incident in this record we think conclusively 
and irrefutably shows what the real agreement was in 
this case. We refer to this incident particularly because 
it is the only time that the defendants, Mr. and Mrs. 
Harry Price, got together at one time with the real 
estate agents who were attempting to negotiate a deal. 
The incident referred to is the meeting which took place 
in Hansen's office in late October, 1950. Plaintiff has 
acknowledged the importance of this meeting because 
Paragraph 12 of the Findings of Fact states that this 
meeting was to be the "final closing" of the transaction 
(R. 254). Let us look first at the documents that were 
before these parties at this meeting. Hansen and Rich, 
plaintiff's witnesses, both say that Exs. G, H, and 0 
were there (R. 91, 149). These documents are consistent 
only with the trade arrangement. It is undisputed that 
Ex. E was not present nor was it discussed (R. 92). 
Now it seems to us, and this is a point that has never 
been satisfactorily explained in this case, that if Ex. E, 
the agreement sued upon, was the true agreement of the 
parties, then why didn't at least one of the people present 
at that meeting mention that the documents before them 
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and which were then being considered, and which the 
Prices were being asked to sign, were not the docu1nents 
to be signed up at alH "\Yhy didn't one of the real estate 
agents who prepared the docu1nents in advance of the 
meeting protest that those docu1nents were not the deal 
to be signed up 1 Instead of this, 've find conclusively and 
undisputably that the real estate agents, as well as the 
defendants, considered that Exs. F, G, and H, repre-
sented the whole deal to be signed up by appellants. 
No one mentioned or discussed Ex. E, or proposed per-
forming its terms. Since these exhibits constitute the 
deal to be signed up, and to be closed, it is clear beyond 
question that plaintiff cannot attempt to enforce Ex. E 
here. 
If our default, as is alleged, was because we failed 
to sign the Ex. F, the real estate contract to buy the 
Mollerup property, and Ex. H, the deed to Mollerup for 
credit, according to Exs. J and J-1, why should we now 
be ordered to execute a different deed to a different 
grantee for a different consideration f 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT BELOW IMPROPERLY GRANTED SPECI-
FIC PERFORMANCE BECAUSE THE CONTRACT EN-
FORCED BY THE COURT BELOW WAS SIGNED BY DE-
FENDANTS, MRS. HARRY PRICE AND MRS. MARCUS 
PARR, UNDER MISAPPREHENSION, MISREPRESENTA-
/ TION, AND MISTAKE, AND HENCE, SAID CONTRACT IS 
UNENFORCEABLE IN EQUITY. 
It is well settled that equitable relief should not be 
granted against defendants who acted under misappre-
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hension, misrepresentation, or mistake as to the nature 
or effect of the contract sought to be enforced. 
Vermeulen vs. Meyer, 29 N.W. 2d 232 (Iowa 1947), 
at 237: 
"As often stated, an agreement to be speci-
fically enforced must have been entered into 
without misapprehension, misrepresentation, or 
oppression." 
Clay vs. La.ndreth, 45 S.E. 2d 875 (Va. 1948) at 879: 
"Courts of equity will not decree specific 
performance in cases of fraud or mistake, or of 
hard and unconscionable bargains or where the 
decree would produce injustice, or, generally, in 
any cases where such a decree would be inequi-
table under all the circumstances." 
The rationale upon which these equity doctrines 
are based is that an equity court will not enter a decree 
that is inequitable for one of the parties. 'See, Annota--
tion, 65 A.L.R. 7 (1930) at 98: 
"Since a decree for specific performance is 
not a matter of strict right, on proof of the agree-
ment, such relief may be defeated by showing that, 
in the circumstances, to require the specific per-
formance of the contract would be inequitable." 
As stated in Vermeulen vs. Meyer, supra, at 237: 
"The cases quite generally hold that specific 
performance must not result in undue hardship 
and it is the general rule that it will be granted 
where it appears from the circumstances of the 
particular case that it subserves the ends of jus-
tice; and on the other hand it will be denied when 
it appears that it will produce hardship or in-
justice to either of the parties." 
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Under Part III, supra, we have pointed out that an 
equity court may not Inake a contract for the parties 
which they theinselYes did not ntake and then enforce it. 
So, here, under this Part IY, we further point out as a 
broad proposition of law, that an equity court may not 
enforce a contract when to do so would be inequitable or 
unjust for either party. · 
And, under this Part IV, as well as the preceding 
Part III, the inquiry of the equity court must not be 
confined to any particular written document that has 
been received in evidence. The Court must find from 
all the documentary and other evidence that the con-
sequences of enforcing a contract are equitable and 
just. See 49 Am. Jur., SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 
Sect. 58: 
"Equity, in decreeing specific performance, 
requires not only that the contract be just and 
equitable in its provisions, but that the conse-
quences of specific performance likewise be equi-
table and just." · 
An equity court is, therefore, obliged to ascertain 
from all the evidence that the relief gran ted is fair and 
equitable to the defendants. 
Moreover, it is well settled that the plaintiff must 
plead and prove as a part of his case that the contract 
itself and particularly the consequences of enforcing it 
are fair and equitable to the defendant. Rittigstein vs. 
Dignan, 9 P. 2d 856 (Cal. App. 1932). See, also, Anno-
/ tation, 65 A.L.R. 7 ( 1930) at 63 : 
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"A well established rule of Courts of equit: 
is that, in a suit for specific performance, it mus 
be affirmatively shown that the contract is fai: 
and just and that it would not be inequitable t< 
enforce it." 
In applying these propositions of law to the facb 
of this case, we make three specific contentions: 
1. That Ex. E is unenforceable because it was no1 
completed when the women defendants signed it, and it 
was not intended to be used as now attempted, and in 
addition, Lewis Hansen, who kept it, represented to the 
women that they were not bound in any way unless and 
until Harry Price, Jr. should sign. 
2. The evidence shows that there was a mutual 
mistake in that the defendants intended to trade their 
property to A. C. Mollerup in return for property to be 
received from him, and that the plaintiff knew this and 
expected that he should receive a deed from A. C. Mol-
lerup as a part of a trade arrangement. 
3. That Ex. E is unenforceable because there is, 
at least, a uni-lateral mistake on the part of defendants 
which necessarily precludes equitable relief in favor of 
the plaintiff since defendants have offered to restore 
the status quo. 
We will deal with each of these three contentions 
separately and in the order above set forth. 
(1) 
It is clear beyond dispute, and both women defen-
dants testified, that Ex. E was not filled out as it is now 
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at the time they affixed their signatures to it (R. 172, 
190). 
We will point out several of the more important 
factors which tend to support the women's testimony. 
In the first place, it is not regular for an earnest 
money agree1nent to be signed in the first instance by 
the seller. As the Court can ascertain from reading the 
earnest nwney agremnents involved in this case, they 
clearly indicate on their face that they should be initially 
signed by the purchaser, who makes the deposit or pay-
ment called for. These earnest money forms recite that 
they are accon1panied by a payment from the purchaser, 
and they further recite that the payment is given subject 
to the seller's approval within a certain period of time. 
Respondent had previously signed one of these (Ex. 2) 
as an offer. This Exhibit 2 would have been used if a 
cash deal would have been considered. It is undisputed 
that Ex. E had not been signed by respondent at the time 
the women signed. The women signed, according to 
Hansen, on September 21st; Ravarino signed on October 
5th. This irregularity misled l\1rs. Parr, who relied on 
the language in the other earnest money receipt (Ex. J), 
which indicates that the contract is unenforceable unless 
approved by the seller within a certain period of time. 
This one specified three ( 3) days. She took this to mean 
that the agreement (Ex. E) was not binding, and that 
Harry Price would have to sign it before it would be 
legally effective ( R. 190, 191). 
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-After considering only the trade with the Mollerups 
for some weeks and having already signed as buyers of 
the Mollerup property, Ex. J, which calls for the pay-
ment of $35,000-$17,000.00 as recited therein after 
receiving a credit of $18,000.00 for the warehouse lot, 
the only reason for these women signing another such 
document (now Ex. E), or for the real estate agent to 
have had them sign such, would be its contemplated use 
on the other, or seller's end, of that Mollerup trade. 
It could have only been expected that Mollerups would 
also sign both of these (Ex. J and Ex. E) as they did 
sign Ex. J. It certainly couldn't be expected that only 
Ex. J would be used on this trade deal and that Ex. E 
would be filled out so as to be used, or that it would be 
used, to make out the totally inconsistent transaction 
now claimed. 
Secondly} if Ex. E had been filled out as it now is 
at the time the women signed it, it was so filled out with-
out any authority whatsoever from plaintiff. Plaintiff's 
testimony is as clear as it possibly could be-that prior 
to October 5th, plaintiff and Hansen had discussed only 
a figure of $18,000.00, and that it was only on this date, 
October 5th, that Ravarino first authorized Hansen to 
present an offer to defendants for the $19,000.00 figure 
(R. 245). It is highly irregular, improbable, and con-
trary to business practice for an agent to make an offer 
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Thirdly, it is certainly strange and incredible for 
Hansen to contend that Ex. E was filled out in its present 
form at the time the won1en signed it when, following 
the signing of Ex. J and Ex. E, Septen1ber 21, 1950, 
Hansen instructed Rich to draw up Ex. F, the unifonn 
real estate contract that e1nbodies the tern1s of Ex. J 
(R. 1-±5, 1-±6). Exhibit F was drawn up on September 
30th on the instructions of Hansen ( 154, 155). Since 
Ex. F provides, on its face as clear as day, that defen-
dants were to convey to A. C. Mollerup for an $18,000.00 
credit, it is basically inconsistent with Ex. E. This con-
duct on Hansen's part plainly is inconsistent with his 
first statement that Ex. E was filled out when the women 
signed it. Obviously if that were the case, Hansen 
would have proceeded to prepare documents to carry out 
its terms. Instead of this, however, and this is very 
important, Hansen proceeds thereafter as if there is 
no such document as Ex. E in existence, and draws all 
subsequent documents in accordance with Ex. J. The 
acts done by Hansen following September 21st are wholly 
in conflict with any claim that Ex. E was filled in when 
the women signed it. 
Fourthly, it is very strange, also, that if Ex. E were 
filled out in its present form when signed by the women 
that, at the same time, the women would then make a 
$500.00 down payment to apply on the purchase price 
of the Mollerup property (R. 80). This payment makes 
sense only insofar as it relates to the carrying out of 
Ex. J by the terms of which the defendant women were 
to pay money to A. C. Mollerup, not receive money from 
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-Ravarino. This payment has no relation at all to Ex. E. 
Certainly no one would know better than Hansen, who 
elicited the $500.00 payment on his own, that it was paid 
solely pursuant to Ex. J. Hence Hansen's conduct in 
accepting the payment operates conclusively as an admis-
sion that the only writing then considered was Ex. J 
insofar as he and the women were concerned. 
Fifthly, and the factor which is strangest of all, 
1s that by Ex. E and Ex. J, which were signed on the 
same day at the same time, these women at the same 
time understandingly agreed to convey the same property 
to two different persons. This is the necessary effect 
of both Exs. E and J. Exhibit J provides for a convey-
ance to A. C. Mollerup for $18,000.00 credit; Exhibit E 
provides for a conveyance to plaintiff for $19,000.00 
cash. No person, not even these inexperienced women, 
would knowingly agree to convey the same property to 
two different grantees, at the same time. 
Sixth, it is suspicious that the women were never 
given a copy of Ex. E (R. 114, 173, 237). They were, 
on the other hand, given a copy of Ex. J ( 237). Hansen 
says that this was so because Ravarino had not signed 
E. But, since these earnest money agreements are exe-
cuted in triplicate, there is no reason not to leave a copy 
with the party who first signed, just as he gave them 
(Ex. J-1) the pink copy before Mollerups had signed this. 
Moreover, a copy could have been furnished the women 
after Ravarino had signed, but this was never done. 
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Scrcntl~, inuuediately following the signing of Exs. 
E and J, Hansen caused the abstracts on the Mollerup 
property to be exanrined by E. C. Jensen, the attorney 
for the Prices ( S-±). This conduct is clearly only con-
sistent with the belief on Hansen's part that Ex. J was 
the deal to be carried out. The abstract of title on •the 
~lollerup property would only be examined if it was 
contemplated that the Prices and Mrs. Parr were to 
acquire the :Jlollerup property. That examination makes 
no sense at all if Exhibit E were the true existing con-
tract considered by the parties. 
Eighth, following the signing of Exs. E and J on 
September :21st, Hansen tried to get Harry Price to sign 
up for the utilities on the ill ollerup property as of the 
first day of October (95, 96). Since, by the clear terms 
of Ex. J, it was proposed that defendants would acquire 
the :Jlollerup property by trade, this conduct on Hansen's 
part indicates that Hansen was urging Harry Price to 
go ahead on the deal represented by Ex. J. Here again 
Hansen manifests that he believes Ex. J is the only 
proposed agreement then in existence. 
For these reasons, we feel that it was highly im-
probable, if not impossible, that Ex. E could have been 
filled out in its present form at the time the women 
defendants signed it. Particularly is this true, because 
prior to the actual date on which the agreements were 
signed there is no evidence at all which indicates any 
discussion with reference to its contents (79, 80). And, 
on the actual date when Mrs. Parr signed, Hansen 
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-comes right out and says that there was no discussion 
at all, let alone any discussion regarding the $19,000.00 
figure ( 113, 122, 123). And, in regard to the discussion 
which took place on the date when Mrs. Price signed, 
Hansen says that the discussion concerned only the 
Mo!lerup deal represented by Ex. J (80). And, while 
all defendants testified that they never discussed or 
heard of a $19,000.00 figure, Hansen appears at one 
point to claim it was mentioned to Mrs. Price (R. 80), 
even then by his own testimony it was mentioned only 
upon the Mollerup deal and the credit to be given upon 
the conveyance of the Price property to Mollerup (80). 
It is impossible to believe that these ladies would 
just up and sign out of a clear blue sky for a figure of 
$19,000.00, a sale which had not been discussed at all 
with either of them, and when they had just signed 
another agreement to trade the same property. Espe-
cially is this so since the trade had been investigated, 
the properties examined and appraised, and a $500.00 
deposit just paid on this, by them. There was consider-
able discussion prior to September 21st regarding the 
trade arrangement. Prior to this time Hansen was 
endeavoring to furnish defendants with properties that 
were suitable for a trade. Later appellants had an 
appraisal of the Mollerup property and consulted with 
Mr. Schluter with regard to the trade (R. 77, 80). Time 
was given to clearing the Mollerup title, checking rents, 
and considering utility serTice charges. Hence, it is 
reasonable to assume that when docmnents are drawn up 
that they are consistent with the prior negotiations and 
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arrangements. This is a necessary assu1nption indulged 
in by business1nen acting in good faith, as well as by 
laymen. 
Note also as to Ex. E, that .Mr. Hansen who got it 
and had it all the tin1e, does not deny, although he indi-
cates a little uncertainty about it, that he represented 
to the w01nen that Exs. E and J were not legally effective 
until Harry Price should join in thmn (R. 84, 122, 123). 
The women testified unequivocally and positively 
that Hansen made this representation to them (R. 169, 
176, 190, 191). Attorney Ed Jensen says that it is his 
best recollection that Lewis Hansen told him that he 
had told the women that these would not be legal until 
Harry signed (R. 209, 210). And, what is just as im-
portant, :Mr. Jensen also testified that the women both 
told him that Hansen had made this representation. 
Since these women then retained Mr. Jensen as their 
counsel, and this controversy had not then arisen at all, 
it is highly unlikely that they would have any motive 
for or would misrepresent to him any statements Hansen 
made. It is apparent then that the only :finding that can 
be made on this issue, in view of this testimony, is that 
it was represented to the women that Ex. E was not 
legally effective. This, of course, means that the women 
were acting under a misrepresentation of fact which 
would rnake it inequitable to enforce Ex. E against them. 
Cf. David vs. Kendrick, 182 F. 2d 243 (C.A.D.C. 1950). 
(2) 
By reason of a mutual mistake here on the part of 
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plaintiff and defendants, Ex. E 1s unenforceable m 
equity. 
We have previously set forth, in detail, the tran-
saction that was clearly intended by defendants. That 
transaction, briefly, consisted of a trade of the warehouse 
property to Mollerup, plus the payment to Mollerup 
of $17,000.00 in monthly installments, in return for 
property owned by A. C. Mollerup to be conveyed by 
him to defendants. Since this transaction is inconsistent 
with Ex. E, that exhibit does not express the intention 
of defendants. 
We contend here, and we shall point out, that plain-
tiff was fully informed regarding the trade arrange-
ment, and that he was fully cognizant of the fact that 
he was to receive a deed from A. C. Mollerup. 
Lewis Hansen, when his deposition was taken, 
clearly stated that the transaction was a three-way trade 
arrangement, and he stated that it was 'a trade arrange-
ment as far as the defendants were concerned (R. 104, 
108, 109, 110, 132, 133, 134). At the trial, he attempted 
in the abstract to go back on this testinwny. His retrac-
tion is very much weakened, however, because Hansen 
stated on the trial, when testifying to concrete facts, 
that Ravarino was told and therefore knew that he was 
to receive a deed from A. C. Mollerup (R. 109, 110). 
He bought the Terry strip (Ex. N) the next day after 
his broker got the deed fron1 Mollerups (Ex. 0). That 
the real estate agents, Rich and H:ansen, knew this, of 
course, is clear beyond question. Rich drew up Ex. 0, 
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the deed fro1n A. C. :\Iollerup to Ravarino, hhnself (R. 
116, 1-16) . .:\.nd these real estate agents drew up the other 
documents for the purpose of presenting thein to the 
parties to con1plete the trade (R. 146). It is, therefore, 
clear that Ex. E is not consistent with R'avarino's inten-
tion or that of his agent. r_rhere is, therefore, a n1utual 
mistake here which necessarily precludes equitable relief. 
See 49 .Am. Jur., SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, Sect. 
5-l. See, also, Annotation, 65 A.L.R. 7 ( 1930) at 97, et 
seq. 
(3) 
Even if the mistake was on the part of only one 
party to the contract that is sufficient to prevent equitable 
relief in favor of plaintiff here. See 2 Pomeroy, EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE, (3d Edition), Sect. 860: 
"A mistake, which is entirely the defendant's 
own, or that of his agent, and for which the 
plaintiff is not directly nor indirectly responsible, 
may be proved in defense, and may defeat spe-
cific performance. This is indeed the very essence 
of the equitable theory concerning the nature 
and effect of mistake." 
Kerr, FRAUD AND l\IISTAKE, Page 411: 
"A court of equity will, however, in many 
cases refuse to grant a plaintiff the peculiar 
remedy of specific performance of a contract, 
which the defendant has entered into under a 
mistake, although plaintiff was not privy to the 
mistake, nor implicated in its origin." 
See, also, the following cases that support this 
proposition of law: 
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Vidt vs. Burgess, 136 ·s.w. 1080 (Ky. 1940); Cav-
alieri vs. Hess, 272 P. 295 (Cal. 1928); Windust vs. Sut-
ton, 103 P. 10 (Wash. 1909); Jacklich vs. Baer, 135 P. 
2d, 179 (Cal. 1943); DeFeo vs. Smith, 203 P. 2d 485 
(Colo. 1949). 
In most of these cited cases the contract was clear 
and explicit on its face, but one of the parties disagreed 
with the other party regarding the actual intent. 
We have already adverted, under Part III, to the 
mistake that exists on defendants' part regarding the 
property to which Exs. E and J were intended to apply. 
We here wish to point out two more very funda-
mental factors that indicate not only that defendant 
women, if they had signed Ex. E in its present form, 
were laboring under a mistake, but also that it would be 
highly inequitable to enforce Ex. E against them. 
In the first place, it is undisputed that all the de-
fendants did not wish at any time to sell their property 
for cash. The women and Harry Price felt and said 
that the cash in these times would not do them any 
good (R. 24, 164, 187, 192, 193). Secondly, because of 
income tax reasons, the women and Harry Price were 
only interested in a trade. 
This Court can take judicial notice that these two 
reasons are highly important and material during these 
modern times. This Court may take judicial notice that 
the dollar has depreciated in value. It may also notice 
that a transfer in accordance with Ex. E would subject 
the sellers to an income tax. 
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In view of these undisputed circumstances, it seems 
highly inequitable to us that Ex. E should be enforced 
in equity as against these defendants. If Ex. E is 
enforced against then1 they will be subject to con-
sequences which it was always their primary purpose 
to avoid. They even went so far as to have the trade 
arrangement subn1itted to the Revenue Department in 
order to n1ake absolutely sure that transaction would 
have no tax consequences at all. Plaintiff's own witness 
so testified ( R. 14-!, 155). 
Particularly should relief be denied plaintiff when 
the status quo may be restored. See 49 Am. Jur., SPE-
CIFIC PERFORMANCE, Sect. 55: 
"Even though the mistake is that of the 
defendant or his agent and the plaintiff is neither 
directly or indirectly responsible therefor, the 
Court may, and ordinarily will, refuse a decree 
of specific performance where the mistake is a 
material one and the enforcement of the contract 
under the circumstances would be inequitable or 
a hardship to the defendant, particularly where 
the plaintiff does not claim to have changed his 
position before he was notified of the mistake or 
suffered any loss by reason of having entered 
into the contract." 
The women defendants, in their amended answers, 
also alleged that they would relieve plaintiff from the 
consequences of his purchase of the Terry property, 
and all appellants offered, (R. 9, 12) prior to the law 
suit, to repay plaintiff what he paid for the Terry prop-
erty. This is the only change of position alleged or 
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claimed. This offer by defendants does complete equity 
between these parties in view of the clear and undis-
puted evidence that a mistake was made by the women, 
both as to the subject matter and the terms of ·Ex. E. 
We do not see how it can be contended otherwise in this 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
We shall here briefly summarize the contentions that 
we have made in this case under Points I, II, III, and 
IV, above. 
First we contend that there is no oral eontract here 
between respondent and appellant Harry Price. We so 
contend because there is no evidence that any promise 
or offer was made by Harry Price, nor any offer or 
promise in any sense referable to the contract sued upon; 
that any offer or promise on Price's part was communi-
cated to respondent; or that respondent ever accepted 
any offer or promise made by appellant Harry Price. 
There is likewise no evidence that any offer for a cash 
S'ale of $19,000.00, as decreed here, was ever communi-
cated from respondent to appellant Price. 
Second we contend that an oral contract, even if 
established, is unenforceable because that contract is 
void under the Statute of Frauds. There is nothing to 
prevent the application of the Statute of Frauds here, 
for several reasons. First of all there is no part perform-
ance, and the decisions of this Court have required that 
part performance be shown in order to remove an oral 
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contract for the sale of land frmn the operation of the 
Statute of Frauds. Secondly, there is completely lacking 
here any of the elements of equitable estoppel. There 
is no representation of an existing fact as required by 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel on Price's part; there 
was clearly no reliance by respondent or his real estate 
agents on any representation of Price's; and, in any 
event, any reliance in acquiring the Terry strip of 
property could only be referable to the trade arrange-
ment and as a result of the deed signed the day before 
by the Mollerups, as grantors, to respondent, as grantee; 
and, most important, respondent is not defrauded if 
specific performance is denied him because the appellants 
have offered to relieve respondent of the only act done 
by him to his alleged prejudice, the purchase of the little 
Terry four-rod strip, and thus to restore the status quo. 
Thirdly, we contend that the Court below has made 
a contract for the parties which they, themselves, never 
at any time intended to make, and which they were not 
asked to consider, and which they would not have even 
considered making. 
This is so for at least three reasons. First, appel-
lant Price is not bound by the contract, Ex. E, enforced 
by the Court below and so the women, appellants Mrs. 
Price and Mrs. Parr, are not so bound. This follows 
because the women appellants did not intend to convey, 
and respondent did not expect them to convey, any 
property unless Harry Price joined them in the convey-
ance. Second, the contract enforced, Ex. E, is too un-
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certain and ambiguous on its face to be specifically 
enforced. This is true because Ex. E fails to clearly 
and unambiguously identify the property to which it 
purports to apply, and the description of the property 
in Ex. E is more consistent with the women's understand-
ing as to "1-lot" than with the decree granting two 
lots. And third, the documentary and oral evidence in 
this case shows conclusively that only a trade arrange-
ment involving appellants and A. C. Mollerup was, at 
any time, ever considered by appellants, and that this 
trade arrangement is. wholly inconsistent with the con-
tract, Ex. E, sued upon. And because there is no finding 
that considers or adjudicates the effect of this docu-
mentary and oral evidence, it is apparent that a finding 
on a very material issue has been omitted here. 
Fourth, we contend that it is highly inequitable for 
Ex. E to be enforced against appellants. Particularly 
is this true when the evidence clearly shows that the 
women appellants intended to trade only one lot whereas 
the decree below compels them to sell two lots for the 
price of one; that Ex. E was in blank when the women 
appellants signed it; that it was represented to them 
that none of the e'arnest money receipts they signed, 
including Ex. E, would be enforceable unless and until 
Harry Price should sign them; and because Ex. E, if 
enforced, necessarily imposes income tax liabilities on 
appellants and makes them take cash they have never 
wanted at any time. The action of the lower Court was 
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particularly inequitable in view of the fact that appel-
lants are willing to restore the status quo by relieving 
the respondent fron1 the effects of his purchase of the 
Terry property. 
If any one of the foregoing contentions is sustained, 
it requires reversal here of the decree of specific per-
formance entered by the Court below. We submit that all 
of these contentions are fully supported under the fore-
going four Points of Argument. 
We respectfully submit that the decree of specific 
performance should be reversed. 
MULLINER, PRINCE & MULLINER 
AND EDWARD L. MULLINER, 
.Attorneys for Appella;nts. 
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